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Kentucky's storied Rose decision is known not only for ushering in a new wave of
"adequacy" schoolfinance litigation in the state courts, but it has also been pivotal
in the evolution of the courts' role in educational governance and reform. Since
the Kentucky Supreme Court's decision to strike down the Commonwealth's entire
system ofpublic education, courts have become more engaged with educationalpolicy
and reform. While some have labeled the recent trend towardjudicial intervention
in educational governance unwelcome "activism," others have begun to recognize
the potentially productive role that courts can play in coordinating reform in our
schools. This Articlespecifically discusses the emerging model of the "experimentalist"
governance of schools and the evolving judicial role in that governance described by
Charles Sabel, James Liebman, and William Simon. Under that framework, the
court acts as a destabilizing and disentrenching agent to permit key stakeholders to
construct a new constitutional (or statutory) order This Article suggests that the
experimentalist model may well address three primary objections leveled at court
intervention in educational poliy-making: the separation of powers problem, the
conceptualindeterminacy (orstandards) problem, andthe implementation problem.
To elaborate on the experimentalist model, the Article provides a legal and historical
exploration of how judicial experimentalism may have furthered efforts to use an
on-going class-action lawsuit to systemically reform the special education service
delivery system in a single school district. Though the experimentalist approach of
the court in that case has improved the district's special education service delivery
system in certain respects, the Article concludes with several observations regarding
the possible limitations of the experimentalist model.
I Eric & Nancy Wright Professor of Clinical Education and Professor of Law, Stanford
Law School; Professor of Education (by courtesy), Stanford University School of Education.
I am grateful to Michael Wald and William Simon for their insightful comments on an earlier
version of this Article. I also appreciate the research assistance provided by Shannon Hodge.
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INTRODUCTION
N the five decades since the Brown v. Board of Education Court abolished
state-imposed segregation in schools, the role of courts in educational
policy-making and reform of complex institutions like schools has
been subjected to much debate and spilled ink. From the imposition
of desegregation decrees, to the striking-down of educational finance
systems, to the restructuring of special education service delivery systems,
the judiciary has left its mark on educational policy and schools alike.
Court critics have decried the "imperialist" judiciary's policy mandates,
chastised the courts for wandering into political and educational realms
with which they are unfamiliar, and lamented the judicial affront to our
hallowed principles of democracy, separation of powers, and local control.2
Court advocates, however, have lauded judicial intervention as the only
means to craft educational policy that respects the rights of the politically
powerless.'
The storied Rosev. CouncilforBetter Education, Inc., decision in Kentucky
has played a central role in this ongoing debate.4 While Rose is often cited
as the school finance litigation that ushered in an era of "adequacy" finance
cases (in lieu of the reputedly less successful "equity" litigations),5 the
z See, e.g., DAVID J. ARMOR, FORCED JUSTICE: SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW
(1995) (questioning the efficacy of judicial remedies in desegregation cases); RAOUL BERGER,
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: TIE ThANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 2-3
(1977); LINO A. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE: Th4E SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE AND
THE SCHOOLS 13 (1976) (claiming that court-ordered busing to achieve racial balance in public
schools "may well have a potential for social disruption and dissolution unequaled by the
Vietnam war at its height"); Nathan Glazer, Towards an ImperialJudiciary?, PUB. INT. Fall I975,
at 41,104-23.
3 See, e.g., Michael A. Rebell, Fiscal Equity Litigation and the Democratic Imperative, in
STUDIES IN JUDICIAL REMEDIES AND PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT 1 (1998) (arguing that a "democratic
imperative" has been driving courts to intervene in educational finance policies to ensure a
more equitable and adequate distribution of resources); JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD, TIhE NEW
AMERICAN DILEMMA: LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 134 (1984) ("[Wiere
it not for the courts, there would be little reduction in racial isolation [in public schooling]..
. ."); Frank M. Johnson, Jr., The Role of the Federal Courts in Institutional Litigation, 32 ALA. L.
REV. 271, 274 (1981).
4 Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d i86 (Ky. 1989).
5 See, e.g., William H. Clune, The Shift From Equity to Adequacy in School Finance, 8 EDUC.
POL'Y 376, 378 (1994); Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance
Reform, 48 VAND. L. REV. iOI, io8-O9 (1995); Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School Finance
Litigation, and the "Third Wave": From Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMP. L. REV. I 15 1, 1163 (1995);
Gail E Levine, Meeting the Third Wave: Legi'slative Approaches to Recent Judicial School Finance
Rulings, 28 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 507, 507 (i99); William E. Thro, Judicial Analysis During the
Third Wave of School Finance Litigation: The Massachusetts Decision as a Model, 35 B.C. L. REV.
597, 604 (1994); William E. Thro, The Third Wave: The Impact of the Montana, Kentucky, and Texas
Decisions on the Future of Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 19 J.L. & EDUC. 219, 222 ( 1990);
William E. Thro, Note, To Render Them Safe: The Analysis of State Constitutional Provisions in
Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 75 VA. L. REV. 1639, 1644 (1989).
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case's enduring impact may be its success in restructuring the governance
of education in Kentucky and catalyzing comprehensive school reform.6
Indeed, Rose was not the first case to pronounce an adequacy standard for
judicial intervention in educational finance,7 but it is unquestionably the
first case in which a state's court of last resort declared an entire educational
system unconstitutional, demanded that the legislative and executive
branches overhaul the system to achieve certain goals, and thereby
reordered the governance of education in the state to provide the courts
with a new and decidedly more engaged role. Since that 1989 Kentucky
decision, it has become clear that the state courts have been more willing
to strike down educational finance schemes they deemed violative of their
respective state constitution's education article.8 Perhaps more interesting,
while some courts have been timid in their efforts to reform state school
finance and accountability systems (indeed, some have intervened only to
retreat after a few years),9 many courts have become actively engaged in not
6 See, e.g., Jacob E. Adams, Jr., School Finance Reform and Systematic School Change:
Reconstituting Kentucky's Public Schools, 18 J. EDUC. FIN. 318, 321 (1993); Kern Alexander, The
Common School Ideal and the Limits of Legislative Authority: The Kentucky Case, 28 HARV. J. ON
LEGIs. 341, 341-42 (1991); Bert T. Combs, Creative Constitutional Law: The Kentucky School
Reform Law, z8 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 367, 367 (i191); Ronald G. Dove, Jr., Acorns in a Mountain
Pool: The Rok of Litigation, Law and Lawyers in Kentucky Education Reform, 17 J. EDUC. FIN. 83,
85 (199I); C. Scott Trimble & Andrew C. Forsaith, Achieving Equity and Excellence in Kentucky
Education, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 599, 600 (I995); D. Frank Vinik, The Contrasting Politics of
Remedy: The Alabama and Kentucky School Equity Funding Suits, 22 J. EDuc. FIN. 60, 60 (1996).
7 See, e.g., Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 877 (W.Va. 1979). According to the court,
Legally recognized elements in this definition are develop-
ment in every child to his or her capacity of(I) literacy; (2) ability
to add, subtract, multiply and divide numbers; (3) knowledge of
government to the extent that the child will be equipped as a citi-
zen to make informed choices among persons and issues that affect
his own governance; (4) self-knowledge and knowledge of his or
her total environment to allow the child to intelligently choose life
work to know his or her options; (5) work-training and advanced
academic training as the child may intelligently choose; (6) recre-
ational pursuits; (7) interests in all creative arts, such as music, the-
atre, literature, and the visual arts; (8) social ethics, both behavioral
and abstract, to facilitate compatibility with others in this society.
Id.; see also William S. Koski, Of Fuzzy Standards and Institutional Constraints: A Re-Examination
of the Jurisprudential History Of Educational Finance Reform Litigation, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
1185, 1251-52 (noting that the adequacy concept had been employed by courts prior to the
Rose decision).
8 See MICHAEL A. REBELL, COURTS AND KIDS: PURSUING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY THROUGH
THE STATE COURTS 15 (2009) ("lClonstitutional challenges to the inequitable and inadequate
funding of public education have been litigated in the state courts of forty-five of the fifty
states since 1973, and, in recent years, plaintiffs have won almost 70 percent of them.").
9 In their recent book, Eric Hanushek and Alfred Lindseth argue that "in the last several
years ... courts [have] begun to take a more deferential attitude and to uphold appropriation
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only restructuring educational finance schemes but entering into a dialectic
with the political branches of state government in an effort to insist upon
recognition of constitutional principles and reasoned justifications for the
distribution of and accountability for educational resources.' Rose, in other
words, was a pivotal moment in the ongoing evolution of the judicial role in
state educational governance.
But the Rose case, coupled with litigation in New Jersey," Texas, I" and
levels set by state legislatures." ERIC A. HANUSHEK & ALFRED A. LINDSETH, SCHOOLHOUSES,
COURTHOUSES, AND STATEHOUSES: SOLVING THE FUNDING-ACHIEVEMENT PUZZLE IN AMERICA'S
PUBLIC SCHOOLS 4 (2OO9). See also Eric A. Hanushek et al., Many Schools Are Still Inadequate:
Now What?, EDuc. NExT, Fall 2oo9, at 39,41 (Hanushek and Lindseth stating that "[a]lthough
judicial remedies have played a significant role in school finance in the past, that era is
drawing to a close"); John Dinan, School Finance Litigation: The Third Wave Recedes, in FROM
SCHOOLHOUSE TO COURTHOUSE: THE JUDICIARY'S ROLE IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 96 (Joshua
M. Dunn & Martin R. West eds., 2009) [hereinafter FROM SCHOOLHOUSE TO COURTHOUSE]
("Numerous state court rulings of the past several years indicate, however, that the school
finance litigation movement may have peaked, in that many judges are now disinclined to
undertake continuing supervision of school finance policies."). While there can be no doubt
that the pace of plaintiff victories in educational finance litigation has slowed in the last four
years or so, see HANUSHEK & LINDSETH, supra at 97-107, it may be too early to discern any long
term trend in judicial willingness to participate in educational finance litigation and certainly
too early to declare the demise of adequacy litigation. Indeed, as Michael Rebell has argued,
the judiciary may be in a period of cautious reflection in which it is contemplating what effec-
tive role it may play in reforming failing schools and school systems. Hanushek et al., supra,
at 44. In Rebell's words:
[Tihere has been no diminution in the willingness of state supreme
courts to issue strong rulings on students' basic constitutional right to
an adequate education. What has changed in recent years is that more
cases have reached the remedy stage and more courts are experienc-
ing difficulty in seeing constitutional compliance through to a successful
conclusion....
In other words, the adequacy movement has matured, and the courts
are now grappling with many of the same implementation and compli-
ance issues that have stymied governors and legislatures for years.
Id. I do not, however, predict the future. As I have written elsewhere, William S. Koski &
Jesse Hahnel, The Past, Present, and Possible Futures of Educational Finance Reform Litigation,
in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH IN EDUCATION FINANCE AND POLICY 42, 54-55 (Helen F. Ladd &
Edward B. Fiske eds., 2008), the future role of the courts in educational finance policy is un-
certain, as advocates of judicial intervention can point to a two-decade trend since Rose toward
greater judicial involvement in educational policy-making, while proponents can point to a
more recent cluster of cases in which courts have either refused to intervene or have relin-
quished jurisdiction after initially engaging with the political branches.
Io See, e.g., George D. Brown, Binding Advisory Opinions: A Federal Courts Perspective on
the State School Finance Decisions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 543, 556-63 (I994); Mark Jaffe & Kenneth
Kersch, Guaranteeing a State Right to a Quality Education: The Judicial-Political Dialogue in New
Jersey, 20 J.L. & EDUC. 271, 277 (199).
I I See Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 199o).
IZ See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.zd 391 (Tex. 1989).
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Wyoming, 13 among others, has reignited the debate over "judicial activism"
in educational reform and policy-making. Indeed, in the last three years
alone, four full volumes have been published that take a decidedly skeptical,
if not outright hostile, view of court intervention in public schooling.14 Not
to be outdone, advocates for a judicial role in school reform have begun a
counter-offensive.' s
This Article enters that rekindled debate over judicial involvement in
school reform. I take as my point of departure, however, that the debate
over judicial activism, while theoretically significant, often lacks the
nuance to evaluate the complex role that courts can and do play in school
governance, in the reform of educational policy, and in the restructuring
of public institutions such as schools and school districts. Understanding
that judicial involvement in educational policy-making will remain for
the foreseeable future, to a greater or lesser degree, the better question to
ask is: given their recognized institutional limitations, when and how can
courts be effective in the public project of reforming schools and school
systems? One emerging response to that question is that, in the context
of institutional reform litigation, like school reform litigation, some courts
are evolving toward a model of judicial "experimentalism" in which they
first destabilize the institutional status quo (that has not served the needs
and interests of disadvantaged children) and work toward reform through
ongoing stakeholder negotiation, evolving measures of performance to
address dynamic "conditions on the ground," and transparency to the
stakeholders and the public. ,
6
My objectives here are threefold. After discussing the "separation of
powers" objection to judicial involvement, I first outline the two primary
additional arguments that court critics appear to advance against judicial
intervention in schools: (1) that conceptual indeterminacy dooms efforts
13 See Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P2d 1238 (Wyo. 1995).
14 See FROM SCHOOLHOUSE TO COURTHOUSE, supra note 9; HANUSHEK & LINDSETH, supra
note 9, at 3-4; SCHOOL MONEY TRIALS: THE LEGAL PURSUIT OF EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY (Martin
R. West & Paul E. Peterson eds., 2007); COURTING FAILURE: How SCHOOL FINANCE LAWSUITS
EXPLOIT JUDGES' GOOD INTENTIONS AND HARM OUR CHILDREN (Eric A. Hanushek ed., 2006).
15 See, e.g, REBELL, supra note 8, at 5; Michael A. Rebell, Poverty, "Meaningful" Educational
Opportunity, and the Necessary Role of the Courts, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1467, 1467 (2oo7).
16 See James S. Liebman & Charles F Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined:
The Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE
183, 207 (2003); Charles E Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law
Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARv. L. REV. 10 15, 10 6-28 (2OO3); see also Michael C. Dorf & Charles
F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 465-66 (1998);
Kathleen G. Noonan, Charles F Sabel, & William H. Simon, LegalAccountability in the Service-
Based Welfare State: Lessons from Child Welfare Reform, 34 L. & SOC. INoUIRY 523, 559-61 (2oo9).
To date, although the literature surrounding the judicial role in experimentalist governance
is modest, it has drawn significant criticism. See David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitution:
Democratic Expermentalism and the Failure of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 546-48
(2008).
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
of courts to intervene in educational policy-making, that is, because the
constitutional and statutory language that courts interpret in educational
reform matters is vague and because courts cannot craft clear standards
for reform, government officials and other stakeholders are left with little
guidance to bring about efficacious reform; and (2) that courts lack the
institutional capacity to design and implement effective school reform. 7
While these objections are no doubt forceful, I first note that courts have
developed new processes (e.g., bifurcation of trials into liability and
remedial phases, maintenance of jurisdiction during the remedial phase,
and ongoing monitoring) and new organizational structures (special masters,
magistrates, and monitors) to address these concerns to some extent.
Beyond those court-centric fixes, however, the experimentalist model
goes further to address those problems by crafting a facilitative role that
permits the political branches and other key stakeholders to develop the
standards of reform consistent with broad judicial mandates and permits
the implementation of those standards through policies and programs that
necessarily change as schools and school systems learn from their own
implementation efforts.
Second, I elaborate on the evolving role of the courts toward a more
"experimentalist" role in the reform and crafting of educational governance
and policy. That experimentalist role is not that of the much-maligned
"command-and-control" model of judicial intervention in which courts
unilaterally hand down burdensome school reform decrees. Rather, the
experimentalist role recognizes the court's institutional limitations by acting
as a "destabilizing" agent that "disentrenches" the political status quo,
17 There is a third objection to judicial intervention: that it does not "work." Set
HANUSHEK & LINDSETH, supra note 9, at 145-7 o. But see REBELL, supra note 8, at 30-41. I will
not join that debate here, but have discussed the impact of judicial intervention in educational
finance reform elsewhere. See William S. Koski & Henry M. Levin, Tweny-Five Years After
Rodriguez: What Have We Learned? 102 TcHRS. C. REC. 480 (zooo). Put simply, due to the
complexity of establishing appropriate metrics for whether judicial intervention "works," the
knotty methodological problems in isolating the effects of courts, and the unclear causal paths
through which judicial intervention and the threat of judicial intervention operate, the litera-
ture on judicial impact in educational policy reform remains largely inconclusive and only ten-
tatively conclusive in regard to specific outcomes. See generally DOUGLAS S. REED, ON EQUAL
TERMS: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (2001); John Dayton,
Examining the Efficacy of Judicial Involvement in Public School Funding Reform, 22 J. EDUC. FIN. I
(1996); William N. Evans et al., The Impact of Court-Mandated School Finance Reform, in EouITY
AND ADEOUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES 72, 74-75 (Helen F Ladd et al.
eds., 1999); William N. Evans et al., Schoolhouses, Courthouses, and Statehouses After Serrano, 16
J. PoL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 10 (1997) [hereinafter Schoolhouses, Courthouses]; Michael Heise, The
Effect of Constitutional Litigation on Education Finance: More Preliminary Analyses and Modeling,
21 J. EDUC. FIN. 195 (1995); G. Alan Hickrod et al., The Effect of Constitutional Litigation on
Education Finance: A Preliminary Analysis, 18 J. EDuc. FIN. 18o (1992); Bradley W. Joondeph,
The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: An Empirical Analysis of Litigation-Prompted School Finance
Reform, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 763, 793-97 (1995); Sheila E. Murray et al., Education-Finance
Reform and the Distribution of Education Resources, 88 AM. ECON. REv. 789 (1998).
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thereby facilitating and permitting key stakeholders-including aggrieved
plaintiffs and their allies-to enter into a dynamic dialogue and restructure
schools and school policies to recognize the statutory and constitutional
principles involved.
Finally, I provide a brief exploration of how experimentalism is faring
in a specific litigation aimed at restructuring the special education service
delivery system in a single California school district-the Emma C. v. Eastin
litigation in the Ravenswood City School District ("Ravenswood") in East
Palo Alto, California." Though the litigation sought to effect wide-ranging
reform of the special education system in the district, I focus primarily on
how the court has been able to facilitate the design and implementation
of a pathbreaking inclusive education model through experimentalism.
There, the court has deployed experimentalism under favorable conditions
for complex school reform: a narrow goal of ensuring that all children with
disabilities in the district are to be educated "to the maximum extent
appropriate" 19 with their non-disabled peers; the engagement of all key local
stakeholders, including teachers and other street-level bureaucrats; and
continuous assessment of the program based on selected key performance
indicators followed by ongoing adjustments to policy and practice. Despite
that relative success, I also discuss the challenges that have arisen during
the remedial phase of the thirteen-year-old litigation and conclude with
some observations on the limitations of the experimentalist model.
I. OBJECTIONS TO JUDICIAL INTERVENTION IN EDUCATIONAL POLICY
A. Separation of Powers
Commenting on the Wyoming Supreme Court's "judicial excursion"
into educational finance policy, Professor Michael Heise cautions that the
court "risks upsetting the precarious and delicate system of checks and
balances between and among [the] legislative, executive, and judicial
branches." 0 In apparent agreement, former Judge and now President of
Baylor University, Kenneth Starr opined:
For sound, familiar reasons, the structure of education systems and the
i8 Emma C. v. Eastin, 985 F. Supp. 940 (N.D. Cal. 1997). Although dozens of orders and
opinions have been issued in the case, only one opinion has been published in the federal
reporters. Id.
I9 Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-
1482 (zoo6), children with disabilities are to be educated with their non-disabled peers "[to
the maximum extent appropriate." 20 U.S.C. § 14I2(a)(5)(A). This is the least restrictive en-
vironment ("LRE") mandate. Id.
zo Michael Heise, Schoolhouses, Courthouses, and Statehouses: Educational Finance,
Constitutional Structure, and the Separation of Powers Doctrine, 33 L~AND & WATER L. REV. 281,
284 (1998).
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allocation of resources have historically been an issue reserved exclusively
for the legislature. The fundamental importance of honoring the democratic
process is too obvious to require extended comment. Suffice it to say that
the people are given their strongest voice when they can petition their local
representatives, instead of seeking redress from a relatively remote court
system."'
The primary thrust of the court critics' normative argument against judicial
involvement in school reform appears to be, in overly simplified terms,
that complex educational policy decisions are best left to the legislatures
because courts cannot (and do not) engage in the delicate trade-offs among
competing priorities that the legislature can (and must) engage in and that
individuals and groups, acting through the majoritarian political process,
are best and properly suited to addressing complex social and educational
policy issues. Thus, separation of powers in our constitutional democracy
and the related "political question" doctrine require the courts to restrain
themselves from educational reform work."2
Contrast this suspicion of court intervention with the views of those
who advocate judicial oversight when the "political" branches fail to
protect minority interests. Because courts do not need to be responsive
to majoritarian politics and because their decision-making is based on
21 Kenneth W. Starr, The Uncertain Future of Adequacy Remedies, in SCHOOL MONEY TRIALS:
ThE LEGAL PURSUIT OF EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY 307, 314 (Martin R. West & Paul E. Peterson
eds., 2007); see also Alfred A. Lindseth, The LegalBackdrop to Adequacy, in COURT FAILURE: How
SCHOOL FINANCE LAW SUITS EXPLOIT JUDGES' Gooo INTENTIONS AND HARM OUR CHILRDEN 33,
36 (Eric Hanushek ed., 2oo6) ("Ignoring separation of powers considerations, [courts] have
approached adequacy lawsuits in such a way as to substantially usurp the power of the legis-
lature.").
22 The political question doctrine was articulated in the Supreme Court decision Baker
v. Carr. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). There the Court identified six criteria for analyz-
ing whether a case presented a "political question" and should therefore be resolved by the
political branches: (I) "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department;" (z) "a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable stan-
dards for resolving it;" (3) "the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determina-
tion of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion;" (4) "the impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government;" (5) "an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision al-
ready made;" and (6) "the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements
by various departments on one question." Id. at 217.
Exemplary of the objection to judicial intervention in educational finance policy-mak-
ing based on the separation of powers and the political question doctrine is the argument
advanced by Eric Hanushek and Alfred Lindseth. HANUSHEK & LINDSETH, supra note 9, at 97-
103. Others have noted that the political question doctrine lacks analytic rigor, is not norma-
tively defensible, has only been rarely applied by the Supreme Court, and is inapplicable in
state constitutional litigation. See REBELL, supra note 8, at 23-29. I will not address the politi-
cal question doctrine objection to judicial intervention in educational policy-making because
Rebell has effectively done so and because my response to both the separation of powers and
judicial standards objections addresses the primary thrust of the political question concerns.
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constitutional text and values, supporters of judicial intervention argue
court participation in social policy-making through judicial review is not
only legitimate, it is necessary to ensure the just treatment of all individuals
and groups in a democracy.2 3
This debate between stylized versions of our tripartite government
is, in a sense, fundamentally irresolvable. At stake is nothing less than
opposing views of judicial review and decision-making in a democratic
state. Arguments grounded in political and moral philosophy, history,
and institutional capacity can be advanced for both sides.14 For purposes
of this Article, that conflict need not be resolved. Rather, like Michael
Rebell,"s I view the normative debate over judicial activism as somewhat
anachronistic as courts have become a necessary part of the modern, complex
administrative state. 6 Nowhere is this more apparent, for example, than in
23 See JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD, THE NEw AMERICAN DILEMMA: LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 134 (1984) ("lWlere it not for [the] courts, there would be little re-
duction in racial isolation [in public schooling] .... ); Michael A. Rebell, FiscalEquity Litigation
and the Democratic Imperative, 24 J. EDUC. FIN. 23, 23-34 (1998) (arguing that a "democratic
imperative" has been driving courts to intervene in educational finance policies to ensure a
more equitable and adequate distribution of resources). For the classic defense of the court's
role as a counter-majoritarian check on the political branches, see JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST (1980).
24 Charles Sabel and William Simon make a similar point:
Neither the federal Constitution nor state constitutions specifi-
cally delineate the spheres of the branches of government, and they
do not appear to intend any rigid segregation of activities among them.
Separation of powers is an implied constraint, and it has to be given
meaning in terms of traditional governmental practice or some princi-
pled understanding of democracy.
Sabel & Simon, supra note 16, at io9o.
25 Rebell, supra note I5, at 1529-39.
26 See MARK KOZLOWSKI, THE MYTH OF THE IMPERIAL JUDICIARY: WHY THE RIGHT Is
WRONG ABOUT THE COURTS 217-18 (2O03). Kozlowski finds claims of judicial activism un-
grounded because
the popular branches of government have conferred tremendous powers
upon the courts, in terms of both oversight of the administrative state and
adjudication of claims arising from the numerous statutes that Congress
has passed over the past several decades that allow citizens to seek court
relief for a range of injuries, from racial discrimination to securities fraud.
Grant Gilmore writes that, at the dawn of the modern administrative
state in the 193os, conventional wisdom among legal thinkers held that
"judicial power was a relic of the dead past" that would eventually yield
to adjudication and problem solving by bureaucratic expertise alone,
unaided by generalist judges. Gilmore continues: "What happened, as
is frequently the case, is the opposite of what the conventional wisdom
assumed."
Id.; see also Sabel & Simon, supra note 16 at IO91. Sabel and Simon support the argument that
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the arena of special education in which Congress specifically authorized
private remedies through an administrative fair hearing process with the
right to appeal to the federal courts whenever a dispute arises between
parents and school officials over the meaning and content of a child's
free and appropriate public education.27 Moreover, parties both "liberal"
and "conservative" now freely enlist the courts when their grievances go
unredressed in the political arena.28 Put simply, courts have become part of
the social and educational policy-making landscape.
That said, at least in regard to those judges who are not held electorally
accountable to the public, court critics stand on firmer ground. It is the fear
of concentrating power in the hands of a few unelected public officials that
may ignite the separation of powers concerns. When unaccountable judges
venture into educational policy-making, what is at stake is not necessarily
the violation of some principled division of labor embodied in the vague
"separation of powers" notion; rather, courts must always be aware of the
public's view of the legitimacy of their decisions or run the risk of being
ignored and becoming ineffective. The focus, then, should not be on the
development of some abstract division of labor, but a better understanding
of the conditions under which judicial intervention is necessary, is
potentially effective, and does not threaten judicial legitimacy. Naturally,
such a determination can only be made in the context of actual cases and
controversies, not in the abstract.29
courts have become an integral part of the administrative state:
To portray the judicial activity in structural reform litigation as en-
croaching on the executive and legislative discretion ignores the com-
plexity of the relations among the branches in many of these cases.
Sometimes, as in housing and mental health cases, the legislature has
authorized structural relief....
Moreover, the remedial regimes that emerge from public law cases
sometimes involve elaborate and creative legislation.
Id.; see also MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE
MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA'S PRISONS 3 (1998).
27 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(a), I415(f)(i)(A), 141 5 (i)(2)(A) (2oo6).
28 Scott L. Cummings & Deborah L. Rhode, Public Interest Litigation: Insights from Theory
andPracice, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 603, 604 (2009) ("Even as liberal critics have disparaged
reliance on courts, conservative activists have enlisted them in efforts to block or roll back
progressive change.").
29 Sabel and Simon provide a different response to the separation-of-powers problem of
removing policy reform from public accountability through the ballot box:
Experimentalist intervention serves ... accountability in another,
less traditional way. It opens up the underperforming institution to the
influence of and participation by dissatisfied citizens through stake-
holder negotiation. The stakeholder process[,]... when it works....
enhances accountability to those with the greatest interest in the institu-
tions. As a form of direct rather than representative democracy and as
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From this pragmatist's perspective (that is, the perspective that courts
will intervene in educational policy-making), the better critique of judicial
intervention in and supervision over educational policy-making and school
reform is twofold. First, given the vagueness of the constitutional textual
bases for judicial intervention in educational policy, courts are left without
clear principles to guide the development of equity-minded school reform.3"
As Frank Michelman famously argued, such conceptual indeterminacy can
stymie judicial intervention because reform proceeds without coherence or
clear objectives.31 The second capacity problem is more mundane. Courts
do not possess the technical or street-level knowledge to develop policies
that can be faithfully implemented to produce desired results. Nor do they
enjoy the power of the purse to fund their remedies or the power of the
an informal process without fixed criteria of standing or operation, the
stakeholder process departs from the traditional premises of American
constitutionalism. But it is potentially a valuable elaboration, one that
serves the broader values of fragmentation and accountability in circum-
stances in which, by themselves, traditional political processes would be
unable to do so effectively.
... The stakeholder process permits a more informal and ad hoc
kind of power-sharing and accountability to those who are most strongly
concerned.
Sabel & Simon, supra note 16, at 1094.
30 There can be no doubt that the evolving meaning of equal protection and arcane
phrases such as "an efficient system of common schools" in state constitutions provide little
purchase for constitutional claims. Ky. CONST. § 183. Constitutional text has neither system-
atically guided nor constrained judicial decision-making in educational finance reform cases.
Courts have used vague and fuzzy constitutional language to serve their interventionist or
non-interventionist desires. See Koski, supra note 7, at 1186-88.
31 Frank I. Michelman, Foreword. On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment,
83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 57-58 (1969); see also JOHN E. COONS ET AL., PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC
EDUCATION 290-91 (1970). Coons, Clune, and Sugarman frame the coherence and clear objec-
tives issue as follows:
The standards problem is essentially one of achieving intelligibility.
If the present state financing systems are condemned, it is not enough
simply to declare them invalid. If the court hopes to generate the con-
sensus necessary to meaningful change it must identify with reasonable
clarity the locus and nature of the constitutional defect. Society cannot
or will not respond to canons incapable of communication .... Unless
the court can find an effable essence, its judgments tend to be ad hoc
and unpredictable, qualities which in the school finance case will evoke
nothing but criticism of the court and evasion by the legislatures.
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sword to enforce performance.3" Thus, judicial policy will suffer design and
implementation failures.
B. The Standards Problem
To address Michelman's concern about conceptual indeterminacy, one
might adopt a cohesive and coherent theory of affirmative constitutional
welfare rights that courts could deploy.33 In the context of reforming
educational policy to ensure a more equitable distribution of educational
resources, the quest for a coherent principle to guide reform has bedeviled
scholars and lawyers at least since the publication of Jack Coons, William
Clune, and Steven Sugarman's classic Private Wealth and Public Education,
4
Arthur Wise's Richs Schools, Poor Schools," and David Kirp's "The Poor, the
Schools, and Equal Protection. 36 Recognizing that the U.S. Constitution
Id.; see also Martin R. West & Joshua M. Dunn, The Supreme Court as School Board Revisited, in
FROM SCHOOLHOUSE TO COURTHOUSE, supra note 9, at 3, 15 ("And when courts do engage in
education policymaking, they should strive to contain the pernicious effects of litigation by
offering clear standards that minimize legal uncertainty.").
32 See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE 10-21 (199) (providing an oft-cited
discussion of the constraints courts face in designing and implementing reform decrees that
aim to restructure institutions and social policy).
33 There is an established scholarly pedigree to such an enterprise that was recently
reinvigorated by Professor Goodwin Liu's provocative and pragmatic argument for what
he calls an interpretive role for judges who seek to tie welfare rights to society's shared
understanding of those rights. Goodwin Liu, Rethinking Constitutional Welfare Rights, 6I STAN.
L. REV. 203, 227 (zoo8). Liu argues for an eminently pragmatic approach to the justiciability
of welfare rights:
[Jludicial recognition of welfare rights need not be thoroughgoing in
the way that the logical principles of a comprehensive moral theory
would suggest. Societal norms, traditions, and understandings vary over
time and across social goods, and a constitutional doctrine of welfare
rights should be sensitive to such variation.... [Tihe judicial role is best
understood as part of an ongoing dialectical process by which legislative
judgments are brought into harmony not with transcendent moral
principles, but with the values our society declares its own.
Id. at 211.
While I do not take-up the issue of whether a coherent concept of educational rights can
or ought to be developed, I find Liu's approach to such a project compatible with the pragmat-
ic role of experimentalist judicial intervention in educational policy and school reform. Put
simply, just as shared norms can be used to construct a constitutional welfare rights regime,
shared beliefs as to effective equity-minded reform can be used to craft effective educational
policy reforms under the supervision of a court.
34 COONS ET AL., supra note 3 1.
35 ARTHUR E. WISE, RICH SCHOOLS, POOR SCHOOLS: THE PROMISE OF EQUAL EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTUNITY (1967).
36 David L. Kirp, The Poor the Schools, and Equal Protection, 38 HAsv. EDuc. REv. 635
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might well support a claim that the Equal Protection Clause requires the
state to provide equality of educational opportunity to children, early
scholarship struggled to provide a coherent and workable principle of
equality. The varying definitions of equal opportunity proffered by those
scholars still resonate today. Although Wise recognized that no single
formulation of equality of educational opportunity would be without flaw,
he concluded that courts might well opt for strict democratic (horizontal)
equality, that is "one student, one dollar" as the most manageable standard.37
Recognizing that such a resource distribution would not do enough for
those students who needed more, that is, those who were not equally
situated, Kirp proposed a distribution of educational resources that would
help students overcome inequalities in prior training and background.
3 8
Coons, Clune, and Sugarman disagreed and proposed the principle of
fiscal neutrality which held that the quality of public education may not
be a function of wealth other than the wealth of the state as a whole, an
elegant and workable theory of resource distribution that propelled the
first two decades of educational finance reform litigation.39 The fate of
school finance litigation in federal and state courts need not be repeated
here, but it should at least be noted that all of these theories of equality
of educational opportunity fell into disfavor as courts either found them
unmanageable as distributive principles or feared the political backlash
from the redistribution that would occur to honor the principles.
Enter Rose and adequacy. Adequacy was supposed to bring conceptual
determinacy to guide courts and policy-makers in ensuring that all children
will receive the resources necessary for them to ensure that they develop the
minimum skills and capacities required of all citizens. Despite the promise
of adequacy, both courts and scholars alike have questioned whether the
adequacy standard is any clearer than equity and whether adequacy is the
morally just method to distribute educational resources.' After all, where
should the bar for "adequacy" be set-at bare minimums or at world-class
levels? Is it ethical just to allow some children to be provided with greater
opportunities so long as all children have an opportunity to achieve whatever
is deemed adequate? What needs to be emphasized is that this quest for
conceptual determinacy does not only plague school finance litigation, it
(1968).
37 WISE, supra note 35, at 159.
38 Kirp, supra note 36, at 636.
39 COONS ET AL., supra note 3 1, at 2.
40 HANUSHEK & LINDSET, supra note 9, at 118-28; Koski & Levin, supra note 17, at 489-
95; Paul A. Minorini & Stephen D. Sugarman, EducationalAdequay andthe Courts: The Promise
and Problems of Moving to a New Paradigm, in EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE:
ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES 175 (Helen Ladd et al. eds., 1999); William S. Koski & Rob Reich,
When "Adequate" Isn't: The Retreatfrom Equity in Educational Law and Policy and Why It Matters,
56 EMORY L.J. 545 (zoo6).
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pervades all equity-minded educational policy-making, including policies
for English language learners, students with disabilities, and garden-variety
underperforming students.
Although this quest for sound conceptual principles on which courts may
intervene has serious implications for the continued legitimacy of judicial
intervention in educational policy-making, I will not attempt to resolve that
matter here. Rather, the experimentalist model of judicial intervention
emerging in the school reform context and discussed further below,
appears to have developed without the articulation of clear, measurable,
and enforceable constitutional standards. Rather, judicial intervention in
modern adequacy litigation requires only that the court hang its decision-
making on the (admittedly vague) constitutional language to declare the
legislative, bureaucratic, or school district policies and practices unlawful,
and then proceed to the remedial phase of institutional litigation. In some
instances, the court may articulate the broad goals embodied in the vague
constitutional standard, 41 but such broad goals are hardly a blueprint for
reform. This experimentalist approach side-steps the standards problem
by permitting the new publics, that is, the actors themselves, to learn
from each other and craft the remedial schemes to address the underlying
educational grievance without reference to clear and detailed standards.
I readily concede that such a pragmatic approach lacks the much sought-
after unified theory of equality of educational opportunity and may even
subtly undermine the legitimacy of courts that are supposed to base their
decisions on firmly articulated principles. That being said, our experience
with educational finance jurisprudence has been that courts will, at
most, articulate "fuzzy" standards of constitutionality, declare the state's
41 The Kentucky Supreme Court did just that in Rose, requiring that the remedial
legislation provide the following:
[An efficient system of education must have as its goal to provide each
and every child with at least the seven following capacities: (i) sufficient
oral and written communication skills to enable students to function in
a complex and rapidly changing civilization; (ii) sufficient knowledge
of economic, social, and political systems to enable the student to
make informed choices; (iii) sufficient understanding of governmental
processes to enable the student to understand the issues that affect his
or her community, state, and nation; (iv) sufficient self-knowledge and
knowledge of his or her mental and physical wellness; (v) sufficient
grounding in the arts to enable each student to appreciate his or her
cultural and historical heritage; (vi) sufficient training or preparation
for advanced training in either academic or vocational fields so as to
enable each child to choose and pursue life work intelligently; and (vii)
sufficient levels of academic or vocational skills to enable public school
students to compete favorably with their counterparts in surrounding
states, in academics or in the job market.
Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989).
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educational finance scheme unconstitutional, and embark upon the arduous
task of designing and implementing a remedial scheme." Though one
cannot with any precision gauge the effect this flexible-standards approach
has had on the public's view of judicial legitimacy, it is nonetheless the case
that we have not witnessed rampant disregard of judicial decrees. Perhaps
state legislatures, departments of education, and school districts have come
to realize that the real battle is not over the meaning of vague constitutional
texts or the articulation of clear rights; rather, the salient philosophical,
political, and economic trade-offs, and therefore the actual battleground,
has moved to the remedial phase.
C. The Remedial Design and Implementation Problem
Regarding the second challenge to judicial intervention in matters of
educational policy-that of the court's capacity to craft and implement
effective remedial policies-there can be no doubt that generalist judges
alone lack the subject-matter expertise to devise educational policies that
will enhance educational opportunities for disadvantaged children. And,
more important, cloistered so far from the school and classroom, judges
likely lack the knowledge to understand how street-level bureaucrats
such as school administrators and classroom teachers will respond to
judicial mandates in their own contexts. Courts cannot be there to police
implementation of their decrees or to understand how teachers will integrate
those decrees into their already overly busy workaday lives. The result may
be either outright disregard for unpopular and unworkable judicial reforms
or perverse and unintended consequences when compliance-minded
teachers and administrators hew too closely to ill-designed policies.
One response to the charge that courts are ill-equipped as fact-
finders to understand complex social and organizational problems and
insufficiently expert to develop workable remedies to those problems is,
to be glib, "compared to what?" As Michael Rebell persuasively argues,
courts are accustomed to developing as complete an evidentiary record as
possible regarding problems placed before them and then analyzing that
evidence in a systematic way that influences their decision-making, unlike
their legislative counterparts who tend to treat fact gathering as "'window
dressing' occasions organized to justify political decisions that had already
been made."43 More important, experienced with years of public law
42 See HANUSHEK & LINDSETH, supra note 9, at 136.
43 Rebell, supra note 15, at 1532. Hanushek and Lindseth seem to have the opposite
view of the relative institutional strengths of courts and legislatures: "[Clourts are not poli-
cymaking bodies, and neither their makeup nor the processes they follow lend themselves
to the task of making policy." HANUSHEK & LINDSETH, supra note 9, at 139. They go on to
argue that courts lack the expertise, staffing, access to information, and appropriate informa-
tion-gathering processes to develop workable educational reform schemes. Id. at 139-40.
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litigation, courts have developed processes and organizations to both
formulate and administer complex reform decrees. 44 Rarely is the crafting
of remedial orders done by clerks and judges squirreled-away in chambers.
Rather, through consent-decree bargaining and/or the presentation of
partisan expert opinions and reports, courts rely heavily on the parties
themselves to develop appropriate remedial plans. Indeed, coupled with
the access to information parties enjoy during the discovery phase, two
scholars have argued that judicial investigation into complex educational
finance issues may, at times, exceed the investigations of researchers.
45
Even after the remedial decree is handed down (whether by consent or
judicial fiat), courts employ numerous administrative structures to monitor
and enforce those decrees, including monitoring committees that may
include party representatives, magistrates and masters who may be charged
with resolving disputes or tweaking remedial schemes, and monitors who
evaluate progress toward compliance with those decrees.
46
Put simply, courts inherently possess or have developed both the fact-
finding and the analysis expertise, as well as monitoring and implementation
tools that the other branches may or may not themselves possess. That
courts do not always achieve complete success in restructuring failing
organizations or redressing minority rights is not in itself reason to object
to judicial intervention. 47 Again, one must ask, "compared to what?" As
Rebell points out, none of the court critics "have even claimed that the
other branches of government have been more effective than the courts
in ensuring the productive use of educational funding, or in targeting the
44 See David L. Kirp & Gary Babcock, Judge and Company: Court-Appointed Masters, School
Desegregation, andInstitutional Reform, 32 ALA. L. REV. 313 (198i);seealso FED. R. Civ. P. 53 (pro-
viding for the appointment of special masters to perform certain judicial functions).
45 Clive R. Belfield & Henry M. Levin, The Economics of Education on Judgment Day, 28 J.
EDuc. FIN. 183, 198 (2002).
46 See, e.g., Emma C. v. Eastin, No. C-96-4179 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2003) (order entering
first amended consent decree) (providing for a Court Monitor to collect information regarding
the defendant school district's compliance with the consent decree, evaluate such compliance,
and report to the parties regarding such compliance); Smith v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist.,
No. C-o4-33o6 WDB (N.D. Cal. May 15, 2007) (order entering consent decree) (providing for
the appointment of a Monitoring Committee to oversee the implementation of the consent
decree).
47 Measuring the success of judicial intervention is, in itself, a contested enterprise.
Analyzing primarily the effects of judicial intervention on student achievement in the after-
math of judicial intervention, Hanushek and Lindseth offer one perspective:
We can only conclude then, that, while court-ordered dollars have
bought a host of services and facilities for schools-programs for at-risk
students and preschoolers, smaller class sizes, additional support staff
and other personnel, better school buildings, extended day programs,
and full-day kindergarten, to name only some-these appear not to have
generally bought the improved student performance so long sought and
so urgently needed.
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funds in a manner that would benefit students most in need."' , Indeed,
the courts may possess certain institutional strengths that would allow
them, under certain circumstances, to be more effective change agents
than legislatures or executive agencies.4 9 Precisely because courts need
not be responsive to majoritarian politics and must instead base decisions
on constitutional or statutory principle, they are better suited to vindicating
the rights of minority children not only at the liability phase, but also at the
remedial phase.
Although it is likely true that the charge of judicial incapacity to gather
facts and develop effective remedial policies is overblown, that legislatures
and executives have failed to address effectively the educational needs
of minority students and some of the most intractable instances of school
failure, and that courts may possess certain advantages as equity-minded
school reformers, the experimentalist model of judicial intervention
discussed here need not rely on these comparative institutional advantages
to justify a role for the courts in school reform. The argument here is that the
experimentalist model, in appropriate circumstances, need only destabilize
a status quo that does not ensure the educational rights of disadvantaged
children and then supervise a process toward school reform that is largely
given content by a restructured dialogue among the parties.
II. COURTS AND EXPERIMENTALIST SCHOOL REFORM
To elaborate on this evolving role for courts in educational reform, I
rely on the model of judicial intervention described by William Simon,
James Liebman, and Charles Sabel.50 Courts in certain modern educational
HANUSHEK & LINDSETH, supra note 9, at 170. Rebell offers a contrasting perspective:
[S]uccess in sound basic education cases cannot be measured solely by
initial progress in reducing funding inequities, increasing spending on
education, or raising test scores. All of these outcome indicators are im-
portant, but they are also limited in their scope and in their accuracy....
But ultimately the measure of success for constitutional purposes-and
indeed for all purposes-must be whether the state has succeeded in
establishing and maintaining an educational system that provides mean-
ingful educational opportunities to all students and graduates [sic] stu-
dents who have the knowledge and skills needed to function as capable
citizens and productive workers.
REBELL, supra note 8, at 37.
48 Rebell, supra note 15, at 1538.
49 Id. at 1539-40.
50 Liebman and Sabel specifically label the court's role in experimentalist governance as
"non-court-centric judicial review." Liebman & Sabel, supra note 16, at 281. Here, I will not
use that term because some might believe that this term separates courts from experimental-
ist reform. In my view, the courts are an integral part of the dialectic among key stakeholders
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reform litigations appear to be playing a coordinating role among reformers,
policy-makers, and educational insiders, as states work to develop an
adequate educational service delivery system."1 Rather than dictating
command-and-control remedial schemes or even acting as mere bystanders
during traditional consent decree bargaining, Liebman and Sabel argue the
courts express the broad outlines for the remedial goals and then oversee
the process by which schools, the interests affected by schooling, and
communities in general collaborate in devising specific objectives and school
reform measures to achieve those objectives. 2 Central to this formula is
the disentrenchment of established political interests replaced by diverse
"new publics" with disconnected interests (community groups, business
leaders, civic and professional organizations) who coalesce around the
reform of education." Often with the court's assistance, these stakeholders
periodically correct those measures and the interventions designed to
achieve success on those measures based on empirical reality.
5 4
As specified by Sabel and Simon, this experimentalist approach
proceeds in two distinct phases: the prima facie finding of liability and
the development of the remedy.5 First is the court's initial finding of a
violation of the law (constitutional or otherwise). The judicial finding of
liability is a familiar and comfortable role for courts. As I discussed above,
given the often vague legal performance standards for public schools, there
is much room, no doubt, for judicial attitudes and other influences to play a
role in judicial decision-making,56 but the methods of evidentiary and legal
analysis are quite conventional. An additional important, if not explicitly
stated, condition for a finding of liability under the experimentalist
approach is the plaintiffs' inability to use traditional political fora to
remedy the public institution's (read: school system's) failure to meet legal
standards. This failure may be due to the fact that violations of minority
rights go unredressed in a majoritarian political process (such as school
board governance), that the political process is captured by concentrated
interests, or that the political process is essentially gridlocked, but could
be moved toward a solution beneficial to all parties if the gridlock could be
overcome and the competing interests coordinated. In other words, courts
ought to intervene only when plaintiffs have identified a failure of schools
to adhere to constitutional or statutory standards and when plaintiffs have
who may be in the judiciary, the legislature, the executive branch, community leadership,
etc.
51 Id. at 206-07.
52 Id. at 191-92.
53 Id. at 266-78.
54 Id. at 278-83.
55 Sabel & Simon,.supra note 16, at io62-73.
56 See William S. Koski, The Politics of Judicial Decision-Making in Educational Policy Reform
Litigation, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1077, 1227-30 (2oo4).
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been unsuccessful in pursuing reform through the political process.
Having found that judicial intervention may be necessary, courts are
called upon, at the remedial phase, to ensure remedies for the violation
of rights. It is at the remedial phase where the right is given meaning
and operationalized through school reform. Here the courts need to
engage the new publics in a contextual and iterative process of working
toward the remedial goals. Most often the development of remedies will
be through direct negotiation among the parties to the litigation and,
sometimes, other key community stakeholders. That deliberative process
may be superintended indirectly by the court through the appointment
of mediators, magistrates, or masters, but often is not. The goal is to find
remedial consensus within the broad parameters of the liability finding.
This remedial bargaining is not a one-shot affair. As Sabel and Simon put
it, the remedy takes the form of a "rolling-rule regime."" The two argue,
"The rules that emerge from the remedial negotiation are provisional.
They incorporate a process of reassessment and revision with continuing
stakeholder participation."5 School reform is an uncertain business, and
the construction of performance standards and the means to achieve those
standards must be iterative and responsive to actual implementation
realities. The result, of course, will be the sustained involvement of not only
the new public, but also the court itself. As a matter of legal (constitutional
or otherwise) principle, then, key stakeholders ascribe systemic meaning
to the "right to an education" or "equality of educational opportunity" or
"free, appropriate education" through an iterative process and with a focus
on providing the resources and conditions necessary for all children in their
communities-particularly "at-risk" children-to succeed.
Having coordinated this deliberative process, the ongoing role of the
court is to monitor and referee. Once it has approved the agreed upon
performance standards established through the negotiation process (such
approval is not necessarily a given), the court would fall into the role of
monitoring the defendants' performance and resolving any disputes that
arise. The monitoring role is becoming commonplace. Courts in structural
reform litigation may employ court monitors or monitoring committees
who require reporting from the defendants, who may engage in their own
data collection and analysis, and who are required to make their findings
of compliance or non-compliance known to the parties and public. This
monitoring process provides both transparency and accountability:
accountability to the court, to the plaintiff stakeholders, and to the public at
large. Should the school system persistently fail to meet the agreed-upon
performance standards, the court may require the parties to go back to the
bargaining table to craft more effective policies and practices to achieve
57 Sabel & Simon, supra note 16, at io69.
58 Id.
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compliance or, in extreme cases, use the threat of contempt sanctions to
cajole compliance.
But "compliance" may not be so black-and-white. There may well
be disagreement over the interpretation of the compliance standards,
over the analysis of the evidence, or the feasibility of performance at all
given unforeseen conditions on the ground. 9 Here the court may employ
its magistrates or may step in directly to resolve such disputes. What is
important to note is that such an ongoing dispute resolution role is again
becoming quite familiar to the judiciary
Simon, Sabel, and Liebman have specifically identified aspects of the
Rose litigation as exemplary of the judicial role in experimentalist reform.
In describing the sometimes robust response of legislatures to judicial
liability findings in adequacy cases, Sabel and Simon point out that "[tihese
59 It should be noted that a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision appears to have softened
the standard for modifying or lifting a court-ordered remedial decree, thus making the ques-
tion of compliance even more difficult and potentially providing a wider set of circumstances
under which defendants could be relieved of long-term, judicially-ordered experimentalist
decrees. Home v. Flores, 129 S. Ct. 2579, 2593-95 (2009). In Home, the Court held that the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had not applied the appropriate standard for relief from a
judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6o(b)(5), which allows a party to seek modi-
fication of a judicial order if "a significant change either in factual conditions or in law" ren-
ders continued enforcement "detrimental to the public interest." Id. at 2593 (quoting Rufo
v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 384 (1992)). In interpreting that standard,
the Court emphasized the "sensitive federalism concerns" raised by long-term decrees that
"dictate state or local budget priorities" and that "bind state and local officials to the policy
preferences of their predecessors." Id. at 2593-94. Prior to this decision, such concerns were
not central to the Rule 6o(b)(5) analysis. Home appears to have rebalanced the analysis to
disfavor the long-term work of institutional reform. More telling is that the Court also raised
concerns about federal court decrees exceeding their appropriate limits when they are "aimed
at eliminating a condition that does not violate [federal law] or does not flow from such a
violation." Id. at 2594-95 (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 282 (1977)). Again, such
a refocus of the analysis would seem to render vulnerable remedial schemes that do not di-
rectly address the specific legal violation, but would be necessary or useful to remedying the
underlying violation. The Court emphasized that the Rule 6o(b)(5) analysis should ascertain
whether the specific directives of the remedial decree are supported by an ongoing violation
of the law. Id. at 2597. In other words, there appears to be the possibility that modification
or dissolution of a remedial decree could be warranted at any time that it can be proven that
there is no longer a legal violation, irrespective of whether the defendants complied with
the remedial decree that they may even have agreed to implement in exchange for avoiding
further litigation. That government defendants will seize upon this language to seek relief
from structural reform decrees is no idle concern. Just recently, the Attorney General for
the District of Columbia announced plans to seek relief from the systemic special education
reform decree in the Blackmon-Jones litigation in the District of Columbia's schools in part on
the strength of the Home Court's analysis. See Bill Turque, D.C. to Ask Judge to Dismiss Special
Education Court Order WASH. PosT, Sept. 16, 2oo9, at B4; seealso Tricia Bishop, Bidto EndFoster
Care Edict Fails: City, State Dispute Extension of t988 Oversight Agreement, 'ME SUN (Bait., Md.),
Oct. 1o, 2009, at iA (reporting on a federal district court's refusal to relinquish oversight of
Baltimore's foster care system, despite the city's argument that the Home opinion required the
liquidation of the judicial decree in light of progress made by Baltimore officials).
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judicial efforts have sometimes converged with extensive civic activity
around educational reform. In Kentucky and Texas, for example, lawsuits
drew on the activities of politically appointed commissions of business,
professional, and civic leaders." 60 Liebman and Sabel describe at length
the process of civic engagement that both preceded the litigation through
the work of the Pritchard Committee and the coalescence of the Kentucky
school reform movement and legislative commitment during and following
the Rose litigation.6' They conclude that
in amassing expertise and continuously monitoring the behavior of the
primary reform actors, the Kentucky legislature might be coming to
resemble nothing so much as the ideal activist court, transforming American
institutions, schools included, through the dictates of the Constitution in the
manner imagined by litigation-minded reformers since Brown v. Board of
Education. Indeed, by identifying itself so thoroughly with the Rose court's
goals that it has itself become a court with respect to administering the
remedy, the legislature might be in the midst of developing an innovative
solution to the classic American Legal process question: Which branch
decides?62
It should be noted that the experimentalist model possesses certain
similarities to the "colloquy" model of judicial intervention advocated by
Michael Rebell.63 For example, both contemplate a more engaged role for
the court working toward broad reform goals through a deliberative process.
But there is a significant difference. Rebell's "colloquy" model contemplates
a dialogue among the three formal branches of government. His "colloquy"
6o Sabel & Simon, supra note 16, at 1025.
6I Liebman & Sabel, supra note 16, at 250-66.
62 Id. at 263. It should be noted that Liebman and Sabel also offer a far less rosy in-
terpretation of the legislative response and the efficacy of reform in the wake of the Rose
decision, noting the fact that further litigation has been brought due to the perceived fail-
ings of the Kentucky Education Reform Act. Id. at 251-66. They conclude, however, that
the more recent "reorientation of the Pritchard Commission from state-level actor interested
in local affairs mainly to generate support for legislative reform to a catalyst of truly local at-
tempts at thoroughgoing reorganization may be a harbinger of a fundamental redirection of
the Kentucky model of reform from the outside in." Id. at 266. To be clear, I am not suggest-
ing that the Rose litigation exemplifies the experimentalist approach to governance. To the
contrary, the Rose court issued only one decision that catalyzed the educational reform process
in Kentucky and the passage of the Kentucky Educational Reform Act (which bore many
of the hallmarks of experimentalist regulation such as outcomes-based standards and public
reporting), but it did not continue to monitor the development of the remedial legislation or in
any way provide an ongoing forum for party deliberations during the implementation phase.
That said, Rose was significant in the evolution of judicial involvement in educational policy-
making in that it showed how the court can play a role in coordinating comprehensive school
reform efforts and providing the impetus and/or cover for other stakeholders to act.
63 Rebell, supra note 15, at 1540.
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model recognizes "that each of the three branches has specific institutional
strengths and weaknesses in regard to social policymaking and remedial
problem-solving. The focus, therefore, should be on how the strengths of
each of the branches can best be jointly brought to bear on solving critical
social problems." 64 The Simon-Sabel-Liebman model is not necessarily
focused on those state-level institutions to bring meaning to educational
rights and craft remedial reforms; it also seems to apply to school reform
at the local level with locally affected communities and stakeholders to be
among the new publics.
65
When dealing with large-scale, state-level policy reforms (think
reformation of educational finance and accountability systems) the remedy
and its effects are felt by nearly all involved in the education enterprise.
Accordingly, a dialogue among the judiciary and the policy elites may be
the most manageable and appropriate for a court, as the court will need to
make delicate trade-offs between the limits of its legitimacy and the need
to veto or shape what is ultimately a legislative reform scheme. Contrast
that type of policy reform with the restructuring of failed schools or districts.
Despite protestations to the contrary by some, education is still very much
a local matter. Parents, community leaders, teachers, administrators and
those with a meaningful and immediate stake in school reform are best
suited to, and indeed must be included in, any equity-minded reform
process. Accordingly, the experimentalist approach contemplated here,
with its call for broad stakeholder participation, may well be optimally
suited to the reform of local schools and districts.
There are other advantages to an experimentalist involvement of courts
in the school reform process. First, experimentalism is consistent with the
past two decades of focus on outcomes-based educational reform schemes.
Indeed, it is no coincidence that much school reform litigation has drifted
away from command-and-control, inputs-oriented remedies as educational
policy has drifted towards the establishment of outcomes standards for
children and schools, while leaving much discretion to local education
agencies to achieve those standards. 66
64 Id.
65 It should be noted that the process of policy reform advocated by Rebell, like the
experimentalist model, also includes the engagement of relevant stakeholders outside of the
legislature and executive branch. REBELL, supra note 8, at 97-101 (describing the "public en-
gagement" process employed in the New York educational finance litigation).
66 See id. at 59-64. Commenting on this focus on standards, Rebell maintains:
The result of this colloquy [among the branches] has been that stan-
dards-based reforms have been reconceptualized "as a form of gover-
nance bound to a state's greater constitutional duty to provide students
with an adequate education" and consequently there has been greater
precision and a higher level of validity in regard to both constitutional
concepts and legislatively enacted state academic standards.
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Second, the "bottom-up" development of remedial objectives, policies,
and practices by the new publics is consistent with what has been learned
about the implementation of educational reforms. Since the alarmed
discovery of the policy "implementation problem,"67 educational policy-
makers, at a minimum, have been more sensitive to the realities of street-
level bureaucrats (like administrators and teachers) and how they might
transform top-down policies, and in many instances, they have devised ways
to develop policy in a bottom-up fashion.68 The experimentalist model
similarly holds the promise of including all key stakeholders in remedial
design.
Third, the experimentalist perspective explicitly accounts for the
organizational learning that must occur as implementation realities are
faced. Fixed-rule regimes are ill-suited to the complexities of restructuring
schools. Some amount of trial-and-error is necessary and the flexibility
of the experimentalist model can accommodate such organizational
learning.69
Despite my optimism for the experimentalist model, there is room
for caution. Recall that Liebman and Sabel are confident that the "new
publics" constituted by traditionally diverse interests (business and
community activists, for instance) will disentrench established political
interests when it is "discovered" that local schools are failing.7" Others are
somewhat less sanguine.71 For many families in low-income communities,
Id. at 64 (quoting BENJAMIN MICHAEL SUPERFINE, TIE COURTS AND STANDARDS-BASED
EDUCATION REFORM 162 (2008)).
67 See R. A. Weatherly & Martin Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucrats and Institutional
Innovation: Implementing Special Education Reform, 47 HARv. EDUC. REV. 17', 176-79 (1977).
68 Liebman and Sabel discuss at length the bottom-up reform strategy of the vener-
able Anthony Alvarado in New York's District 2-a strategy that brought academic success to
this mostly poor and working class neighborhood school district. See Liebman & Sabel, supra
note 16, at 217-27; see also MILBREY W. McLAUGHLIN & JOAN E. TALBERT, BUILDING SCHOOL-
BASED TEACHER LEARNING COMMUNITIES: PROFESSIONAL STRATEGIES TO IMPROVE STUDENT
ACHIEVEMENT 92-98 (2006); Joseph Kretovics et al., Reform from the Bottom-Up: Empowering
Teachers to Transform Schools, 73 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 295, 295-99 (199 1).
69 See generally, DAVID TVACK & LARRY CUBAN, TINKERING TOWARD UTOPIA: A CENTURY OF
PUBLIC SCHOOL REFORM 134-40 (1995) (arguing that educational policies should be treated
as working goals that ought to be modified to meet local conditions and the experience of
practice).
70 Liebman & Sabel, supra note 16, at 266-78. Indeed some, such as Jeannie Oakes
and John Rogers, insist that traditional policy reform that is driven by technocrats without
constituent "voice" will do little to further the cause of educational equality. JEANNIE OAKES
& JOHN ROGERS, LEARNING POWER: ORGANIZING FOR EDUCATION AND JUSTICE 107-09 (2006).
Rather, meaningful equity-minded reform can only occur through grassroots organizing and
political mobilization aimed at changing the powerful norms or "logics" that work to maintain
the inequitable status quo. Id.
71 See, e.g., Helen Herschkoff & Benedict Kingsbury, Crisis, Community, and Courts in
Network Governance: A Response to Liebmaan and Sabel' Approach to Reform of Public Education,
28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 319, 324 (2003). Herschkoff and Kingsbury question the
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group political mobilization is not their day job. They may not possess the
time and technical expertise to participate in sustained dialogue and school
reform efforts. This leaves the very real possibility that the disentrenched
interests will retrench as traditional political power-brokers (read: middle-
and upper-middle-class whites and suburbanites) and educational
technocrats will garner control over the "new publics." Moreover, even if
educational "rights" were well-defined, the prospect of using litigation to
enforce those rights is dicey given the costs and time associated with such
an effort. The collective action problem plaguing such efforts to secure
a public good such as an adequate public education may hinder even the
most resolute efforts of individuals and small groups.
More generally, Professor David Super has argued that the entire
enterprise of deliberative experimentalism has failed and will fail to achieve
meaningful welfare reform:
The decentralized, participatory, and deliberative approach the United
States has relied upon to design antipoverty policies over the past four
decades has prevented it from developing, and mobilizing supporters
around, a coherent, plausible proposal. We have grossly overestimated the
value of deliberation and underestimated the importance of achieving a
meaningful consensus about the substantive principles of antipoverty law.
Indeed, all substantial advances in antipoverty law that we have achieved
are attributable to a second track of centralized, substantive, pragmatic
policymaking on low-salience issues.7"
While I will not detail and address Super's argument that the deliberative
foundation of Liebman and Sabel:
Absent ... formal protection, it is not clear that the stakeholder net-
works on which [Liebman and Sabel] base their strategy will be able
to take root as progenitors of reform, particularly among the most dis-
advantaged.
Indeed, we fear that the forms of action that Liebman and Sabel
offer may provide only illusory protection for those students who are
left behind.
Id.; see also Martha Minow, School Reform Outside Laboratory Conditions, 28 N.Y.U. REv. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 333, 336 (2003) ("Although Liebman and Sabel acknowledge that a vital role
remains for grassroots and community advocacy, nothing in their theory will equip parents
and other community members to develop the expertise and options necessary for them to
hold the other actors to account."); John A. Powell & Marguerite L. Spencer, Brown Is Not
Brown and Educational Reform Is Not Reform if Integration Is Not a Goal, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 343,347 (2003) ("The dissatisfying hierarchies collectively destabilized by 'new
publics' are being replaced by new hierarchies that continue to marginalize and stigmatize
impoverished persons of color.").
72 Super, supra note 16, at 545.
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approach to antipoverty law has obstructed resolution of normative
disagreements about society's responsibility to low-income people (suffice
it to say, that the experimentalist approach consciously avoids the necessity
of complete agreement on normative "first principles," such as the meaning
of equality of educational opportunity), it is worth describing Super's
concern that because the deliberative process of experimentalism requires
continuous engagement over a long period of time, thus taxing the expertise
and time of low-income persons and their advocates, the process is subject
to distortion in favor of those with resources and "[i]deologues seeking to
make expressive points on both the Right and the Left [who] may have those
resources."73 This critique is similar to the preceding concern that, lacking
the expertise and resources, disadvantaged persons and their communities
will, over time, become marginalized in the experimentalist process and
elite interests and players will retrench. The added gloss provided by
Super is that ideologically-driven parties will likely have more staying
power and will influence the debate in ways that may or may not benefit
the disadvantaged children and their communities who stand to win or lose
from reform. The difficulty with Super's critique seems to be the implicit
assumption that, at least for localized efforts to reform local institutions, there
are viable alternatives to judicially induced experimentalism and that, even
with some distortion from ideologues, disadvantaged communities would
be better off with the status quo. Indeed, a condition for court engagement
in institutional reform is that other avenues of redress are unavailable. The
salient question is whether "'expressive ideologues" will, over time, make
conditions worse for disadvantaged children in an experimentalist regime.
Apart from the concern that the plaintiffs' (read: those adversely affected
by the failure of the school system) inability to organize and sustain attention
to the iterative remedial process, there is an open question as to the court's
capacity to sustain attention over an extended period of time. Even under
the best of circumstances, school reform is arduous and requires a longer
time horizon. The ability to "stick to it" provides a comparative advantage
to courts in the long-term enterprise of school reform. Yet, over long periods
of time, significant questions arise regarding the judiciary's capacity. Can a
single judge maintain such a case on her docket for many years? Can the
system as a whole manage the number of cases that might be brought when
the political avenues of redress are closed? It is far too early for me to make
any judgments in this regard.
But such questions do prompt a final question: what happens if judicial
experimentalism persistently fails to bring about the desired (legally
required) outcome? Continued supervision of the deliberations of new
publics negotiating further remedial policies may be fruitless. Contempt
sanctions-which may have the perverse effect of punishing the children
73 Id. at 547.
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who ought to be the beneficiaries ofjudicial intervention-may be pointless.
Reversion to traditional command-and-control remedial plans may be
similarly ineffective. While I am not so pessimistic to believe that these
conclusions will be reached in many (any?) experimentalist interventions,
one must be concerned about the limits of judicial legitimacy in this new,
engaged role.
With these lessons and the experimentalist framework in mind, I
turn to the litigation that has occupied a substantial portion of the last
eleven or so years of my life, Emma C. v. Eastin. In the next section, I will
describe the efforts of the Emma C. plaintiffs and other key stakeholders
to systemically reform the special education service delivery system and
the state monitoring and oversight system in the Ravenswood City School
District in East Palo Alto, California. While I will briefly discuss the liability
phase of the litigation (a full treatment of which is deserved, but must wait
for another day), I will focus on specific aspects of the remedial phase that
display both a more traditional role for the courts in institutional reform
cases and a more experimentalist approach to judicial oversight of school
reform. I conclude with thoughts on the strengths and limitations of the
experimentalism in Emma C.
III. JUDICIAL EXPERIMENTALISM IN THE RAVENSWOOD
SPECIAL EDUCATION LITIGATION
In the heart of California's Silicon Valley, among some of the wealthiest
bedroom suburbs in the country, lies the City of East Palo Alto, a community
that possesses a rich agrarian history (still evident in the chicken coops,
gardens, and greenhouses nestled among the homes), a proud group
of long-time residents who fought for municipal incorporation and self-
governance of this overwhelmingly African-American, Latino, and Pacific
Islander community, and, unfortunately, a reputation of being a focal point
for crime, poverty, and (until recently) economic under-development. East
Palo Alto is also home of the Ravenswood City School District ("District")
(which also includes the mostly minority community of the Belle Haven
neighborhood of Menlo Park). Ravenswood serves a student population
that is predominantly "minority" 74 -Hispanic (70%) African American
(20%), Pacific Islander (9%) and other 1%.71 Ravenswood is an elementary
74 I place quotation marks around "minority" because not only is the Ravenswood
District almost too% non-white, white students make up only 28% of the public school popu-
lation in California with Latinos being the largest single ethnic group and on the verge of
becoming the majority of California students. CAL. DEP'T OF EDUC., EDuc. DEMOGRAPHICS
UNIT, STATEWIDE ENROLLMENT BY ETHNICITY: 2OO8-O9 (Jul. 7, 2oo9), http://dq.cde.ca.gov/data-
quest/EnrollEthState.asp?Level=State&TheYear=aoo8-o9&cChoice=EnrollEth 1&p=2.
75 Welcome to the Ravenswood City School District-Ravenswood City School District,
http://www.ravenswood.kl 2.ca.us/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2010).
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(kindergarten through eighth grade) district with some 4500 students in its
elementary schools, child development center, and one of the few single-
gender public schools in the country.76 Five charter schools operate within
the District's jurisdiction, including one charter high school."
Ravenswood has the dubious distinction of being among the worst-
performing school districts in California. In terms of student achievement
on assessments mandated by the state's Public School Accountability Act
and the federal No Child Left Behind Act, some 78.3% of Ravenswood's
students were assessed "below proficient" in English-Language Arts, while
71.7% were deemed "below proficient" in mathematics." A staggering
90.9% of students with disabilities were assessed "below proficient"
in English-Language Arts and 85.4% of such students were "below
proficient" in Math.7 9 English language learners ("ELL'), who make up
81.2% of the student population in the District, 0 fared little better, as
80.1% were below proficient in English-Language Arts and 71.6% were
below proficient in Math.8' While Ravenswood, like most California school
districts, has only been systematically assessing student performance and
reporting that performance for the last decade, the failure of Ravenswood
to prepare its students for high school had long been known to parents
and community activists. For instance, Latino parents banded together to
form Padres Unidos to advocate on behalf of their children in the mid-1990s.
They participated in school board meetings, filed compliance complaints
with the California Department of Education ("CDE") and with the
U.S. Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights. Their primary
concerns were Ravenswood's failure to provide Spanish-speaking children
access to the curriculum and the failure to provide an opportunity for such
children's parents to participate in their children's education. Ravenswood
was repeatedly found non-compliant with its legal obligations to its ELL
children.
ELLs were not the only group of Ravenswood children whose rights were
being systematically violated. Throughout the early 1990s, attorneys at the
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 CAL. DEP'T OF EDUC., 2007-2oo8 ACCOUNTABILITY PROGRESS REPORTING, LoCAL




80 CAL. DEP'T OF EDUC., EDUC. DEMOGRAPHICS OFFICE, RAVENSWOOD CITY ELEMENTARY,
LANGUAGE GROUP DATA-DISTRICT WIDE FOR 2008-09 (2010), http://DO.CDE.CA.GOV/DATA-
QUEST/Lc/DISTRITLC.AsPX?CSELECT4168999--4168999%2D%ZDRAVENSWOOD+CITY+
ELEMENTARY&cYEAR=2oo8-o9. It should be noted that 68.3% of Ravenswood's students
are ELLs who have not yet been deemed "Fully English Proficient." See id.
81 See LEA-RAVENSWOOD, supra note 78.
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East Palo Alto Community Law Project ("Law Project"),"2 particularly
David Giles, were inundated with requests from parents with children with
disabilities to represent their children who were not being provided with
appropriate educational services in Ravenswood. During that time period,
Giles and his colleagues represented dozens of Ravenswood children
who had been denied by the District a free appropriate public education
("FAPE") in the least restrictive environment ("LRE"), a violation of the
children's rights under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
("IDEA").13 The families and Giles filed compliance complaints with
the CDE, attended individual education plan ("IEP") team meetings to
advocate for children with special education needs, and even filed for due
process hearings when Ravenswood failed or refused to serve children with
disabilities. Despite frequent findings of non-compliance by the CDE,
settlement agreements vindicating the children's rights in individual cases,
and even the occasional admission of malfeasance by the District, it had
become clear to Giles and the families whom he represented that the
failures of the District were not isolated; they were systemic failures and
more comprehensive and systemic action had to be taken.
In 1996, over the course of several months, the families Giles
represented began to meet with Giles and attorneys (including the late
crusader for children with disabilities, Diane Lipton) from the national
disability rights organization Disability Rights Education Defense Fund
("DREDF") to discuss a potential class-action lawsuit against the District
for its violations of the IDEA, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and
various state special education laws. In compiling the grievances against
Ravenswood, it became clear that the list of systemic failures pervaded
the entire special education service delivery system and would require
significant injunctive relief. These failures, each of which violated state
and federal law, included: (1) failure to identify children with disabilities;
(2) failure to assess children with disabilities; (3) discriminatory assessment
practices (racial and linguistic bias); (4) failure to develop appropriate IEPs;
(5) failure to implement agreed-upon IEPs; (6) segregating children with
behavior problems into self-contained "emotionally disturbed" ("ED")
special day classes ("SDC"); (7) failure to educate children with disabilities
in the LRE, that is, failure to educate them with their non-disabled peers
to the maximum extent appropriate; and (8) instances of physical abuse of
children with disabilities. That the families had identified these systemic
failures should have been no surprise to Ravenswood officials. In the
preceding months and years, Giles and the individual families had met
82 The Law Project was a non-profit legal services agency founded by Stanford Law
students in 1984 to meet the legal service needs of the low-income communities of East Palo
Alto and eastern Menlo Park. The Law Project also served as the primary clinical experience
for Stanford Law students until it was shuttered in zooi.
83 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 (2OO6).
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with district leadership to discuss the recurring problems. Giles even met
with members of the District's Board of Trustees. What became clear to
Giles and his clients was that Ravenswood was not going to undertake
meaningful special education reform in response to the concerns of a single
legal services lawyer and a relatively small group of parents of children with
disabilities.
The failures were not Ravenswood's alone. Under the IDEA, the
state education agency ("SEA"), in this case the CDE, has an obligation
to monitor school districts' compliance with the IDEA and maintain an
effective complaints management system that allows parents and children
to file individualized complaints, provides for prompt investigation of those
complaints and written findings of compliance or non-compliance with the
IDEA, and, to the extent non-compliance is found, requires the CDE to
issue effective corrective actions to the district.' CDE was deficient on
both counts. Given the extensive systemic failures in special education
service delivery, the CDE could not claim that it had an effective statewide
monitoring system in place that would detect and remedy such widespread
denial of FAPE in the district. Moreover, the parents and children in
Ravenswood were able to point to many instances in which individual
complaints had been filed with the CDE, and the CDE either did not act
on the complaints or investigate and issue corrective actions, but rather it
failed to ensure compliance with those corrective actions. As a result, the
families believed that the state was out of compliance with the IDEA.
Having failed in their efforts to address the denial of services to their
children through the IDEA's procedural routes, the traditional bureaucratic
routes, and even the political routes, the families felt they had no alternative
other than to seek the interventions of the federal courts who were obliged
to enforce the IDEA. Eight children, led by the pseudonymous "Emma
C." were chosen to represent a class of all past, present, and future children
with disabilities who live in the jurisdiction of Ravenswood. On November
84 The IDEA provides that each "State Education Agency is responsible for ensur-
ing that (i) the requirements of this [Act] are met." Id. §1412(a)(I i)(A); see also 34 C.ER. §§
300.600, 300.149 to .153 (2009). Moreover, the CDE bears the duty of providing special edu-
cation services because the state of California is ultimately responsible for ensuring that the
requirements of the IDEA are fulfilled. 34 C.F.R. § 300.149(a)(I) ("The SEA is responsible
for ensuring [t]hat the requirements of this part are carried out .... ); see CAL. Gov'T CODE §
7561 (West 2008) ("[Tlhere shall be a single line of responsibility with regard to the educa-
tion of all handicapped children as required by [the Education for All Handicapped Children
Act, now the IDEA]."); Morgan v. Greenbrier County W. Va. Bd. of Educ., 83 Fed. App'x. 566,
5 68-69 (4th Cir. 2003) (explaining that "[sitate eligibility for federal funding" is predicated on
the state assuming ultimate responsibility for the IDEA); Gadsby v. Grasmick, 109 E3d 940,
943-44 (4th Cir. 1997) (explaining that the IDEA "places the ultimate responsibility for the
provision of a free appropriate public education to each student on the SEA"); Kruelle v. New
Castle County Sch. Dist., 642 F.zd 687, 697 (3d Cir. 1981) (explaining that Congress, in enact-
ing the IDEA, desired a "central point of accountability" and "a single line of responsibility"
with the SEA).
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18, 1996, the Emma C. Plaintiffs filed their class action suit against the
Ravenswood City School District and its Board of Trustees, the CDE,
and the California State Board of Education. "5 The complaint detailed
the systemic failures of the District and state, dramatically told the stories
of the eight children who were denied a FAPE, and alleged violations of
the IDEA, Section 504, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and even the
Equal Protection Clause. The Plaintiffs drew Judge Thelton Henderson
of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. Judge
Henderson, a Jimmy Carter appointee, had a deep knowledge of the East
Palo Alto community, having served as one of the town's first legal services
lawyers in the 1960s. Nobody was in a better position to understand the
dynamics of that town.
Though filled with complexity and no small amount of drama and
intrigue, I will only briefly discuss the liability phase of the litigation.
Following the standard script, both defendants initially moved for dismissal
of the litigation on the grounds of exhaustion. After initially agreeing with
them, Judge Henderson reversed himself on reconsideration saying that
exhausting the administrative channels would be futile for the Plaintiffs. He
went further to certify the class of children with disabilities that included
the future children in the district. At that point, the defendants took
decidedly different approaches to the litigation. The CDE, recognizing the
dismal state of the Ravenswood's special education system launched its own
investigation into the Plaintiffs' allegations and concluded that virtually
all allegations, including those against the CDE itself, were meritorious.
Accordingly, in January 1998, CDE issued an extensive corrective action
report that would pave the way for settlement negotiations with the
Plaintiffs. Ravenswood, for its part, fought each and every allegation.
8 6
85 The decision to sue the local school district was no small matter for the Law Project.
After all, the district was a flagship community institution and the city's largest employer.
Expensive litigation would effectively result in some members of the "community" being
adverse to other members of the "community," thus challenging the very notion of who was
the "Community" in "East Palo Alto Community Law Project."
86 Plaintiffs' counsel was-and remains-puzzled by the aggressive resistance of the
District at that time. The District's superintendent, Charlie Mae Knight, who had brought
stability to the leadership of the District, but proved to be a controversial leader (who would
later receive sanctions from Judge Henderson for causing falsified documents to be filed in
the case and, in a separate matter, be indicted, tried, and acquitted on conflict-of-interest
charges), refused to consider that a consensual remedy might be in all parties' interest. After
all, had the district pursued consensual resolution of the matter, it would have been in a posi-
tion to work with Plaintiffs and CDE to ensure that the state share in the costs of remedying
the special education failures. As Hanushek and Lindseth charge, such "collusion" is not
unheard of. HANUSHEK & LINDSETH, supra note 9, at 140. That said, it is not clear to me why
this should pose a problem. Indeed "collusion" (or, as I would call it, "cooperation") among
allies can be facilitated or coordinated in the context of the remedial phase of a litigation. All
parties will advocate for their best interests and there is no reason that other key stakehold-
ers, whose interests may differ from the formal parties, should not be at the table during the
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At the behest of the CDE, two renowned special education academics,
Drs. Alan Coulter and Kathy Gee, conducted a needs assessment for
Ravenswood's special education program and, in July 1998, issued a report
describing the District's failure to comply with the state laws. Based on
the needs assessment, Gee and Coulter drafted an extensive (261 item)
school reform plan that aimed to fundamentally restructure special
education service delivery and bring the district into compliance with the
IDEA. CDE, anxious to resolve the costly litigation, agreed that the plan,
dubbed the Ravenswood Corrective Action Plan (RCAP), would be the
appropriate remedy for the District's and state's failures. Ravenswood,
however, refused to enter a comprehensive settlement agreement and
instead entered a separate settlement agreement on the eve of trial that
left many questions unanswered and was ultimately rejected by Judge
Henderson, who scheduled the matter for trial, but invited the parties to
enter a comprehensive agreement.
While trial preparation was re-ignited during the January to August
1999 time period, the parties nonetheless believed a deal was within reach
and sought the assistance of a mediator to help them craft a three-way
agreement. The centerpiece of the agreement remained the RCAP. While
the RCAP was a very thoughtful workplan for a school district earnestly
approaching self-reform, it suffered from the major flaw that Ravenswood
had no hand in its crafting and therefore was unable to integrate the
expertise of its own professionals and their understanding of conditions
on the ground. More important, there was virtually no buy-in to the plan
and it was never clear that the District's administration would embrace
any corrective action plan, despite ongoing negotiations. Notwithstanding
those concerns, the parties signed a proposed consent decree in September
1999. The primary components of that agreement were: (1) Ravenswood's
agreement to implement the RCAP; (2) procedures for parents and students
to file for and receive compensatory education services for the denial of
FAPE that they had suffered; (3) the appointment of a Court Monitor to
oversee the implementation of the Consent Decree and the RCAP, and to
provide detailed quarterly reporting regarding the District's compliance; (4)
appointment of a parents' advocacy organization to assist parents of special
needs students in working with the District; and (5) continuing court
jurisdiction until the Court determines, after a full hearing, that the District
has in place a system to provide FAPE to all students with disabilities.
In that same month, the Court appointed Mark Mlawer, a nationally
recognized expert in state special education monitoring systems, to serve
as Court Monitor (a position he holds to the date of this writing), and, in
January 2000, Judge Henderson issued the RCAP and proposed Consent
Decree as an order of the Court. Yet, despite assurances to the Court by
remedial planning and implementation.
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Ravenswood's superintendent, Plaintiffs' concerns about Ravenswood's
commitment to implementing the RCAP proved well-founded.
As early as October 2000, Plaintiffs were compelled to send letters to
the District about the continuing lack of appropriate services they were
receiving, and by March 2001, Ravenswood had complied with less than
thirty-three percent of requirements under the RCAP, despite the fact
that they were to begin implementing the reforms in September 1999.
Frustrated with Ravenswood's failure to meaningfully implement the
RCAP and realizing that District leadership had no serious intention to
perform, Plaintiffs filed a motion for the court to issue an order to show
cause why the District should not be held in contempt, a dramatic move at
a relatively early stage in the implementation process. This was dramatic
because any sanction would likely include severe restrictions on the
District's authority to administer special education services, including state
takeover or judicial receivership.
As the parties prepared for the contempt hearing, media scrutiny
of the case and the District became intense. 7 Equally intense was the
litigation, as Ravenswood engaged two separate San Francisco law firms
and eventually replaced them with an Atlanta-based law firm to litigate
the contempt proceedings. But the data were clear. In August 2001, in a
scathing opinion, Judge Henderson found the District in contempt, but
refused to issue any draconian remedy." Rather, in an October 4, 2001
order he gave the District until March 31, 2002 to comply with certain
tasks-what came to be known as "the contempt assignment"--or face
state takeover.8 9 Remarkable about Henderson's opinion was his singling
out of the superintendent and District leadership for their recalcitrance and
failings. Yet, and maybe inevitably, on April 30, 2002, the Court Monitor
reported that the District failed the contempt assignment.
Perhaps reluctant to become the defacto superintendent of schools in
the District, recognizing the growing dissatisfaction with the District's
87 Throughout the contempt proceedings, reporters Sarah Neufeld and Fredric Tulsky
were particularly keen to understand the district's special education failings. Sara Neufeld
& Fredric TuIsky, Despite Court Orde, School District Fails Its Neediest Students: Friends of
Superintendent Get Teaching, Consulting Jobs, SAN Jose MERCURY NEWS, June 29, zooi, at iA.
Neufeld and TuIsky would go on to report on the excessive fees that the district was paying
to an Atlanta-based law firm in the case, Sara Neufeld, Ravenswood Paid Lawyers' First-Class
Travel, Food: Atlanta Firm BilledDistrict $z., Million, SAN Jose MERCURY NEWS, Mar. 9, 2003, at
i A, the use of district credit cards for personal expenses by members of the Board of Trustees,
Sara Nuefeld & Fredric Tulsky, Schools Chief Benefits While Students Lag, SAN JosE MERCURY
NEWS, June 28, 2001, at iA, the personal use of district resources by the superintendent and
the conflict of interest concerns raised by the use of district funds to provide housing loans to
teachers who rented apartments in properties owned by the superintendent Id.
88 Emma C. v. Eastin, No. C96-4179 TEH, 2oo WL 118o636, at *20 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 4,
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leadership, and wanting to see whether the parties could work out a resolution
on their own, Judge Henderson did not immediately order receivership of
the District. During the Spring, Summer, and Autumn of 2002, no doubt
prodded by the threat of receivership, Ravenswood agreed to participate
in an overhaul of the RCAP that would provide stricter performance
measures, a revised plan for integrating students with disabilities, and a
more intensive monitoring system. More important, perhaps catalyzed by
the threat of receivership, several community groups coalesced around the
common goal of ousting the current Board majority and the superintendent.
Among them were the Emma C. families (who continued to routinely meet
with each other and their attorneys), the foundation-funded education
reform group, One East Palo Alto, and Padres Unidos. With the focus on
the November elections, the press also began to run stories critical of
Ravenswood's superintendent. 9° And, in what would prove to be a critical
player in the reform coalition, the Ravenswood Teachers Association, the
District's teacher collective bargaining unit which had been working with
an expired contract in the District, joined the Plaintiffs and the coalition in
seeking the ouster of the superintendent.91
To almost all the community's and District-watchers' surprise, the slate
of three candidates endorsed by the reform coalition won the three open
Board seats, giving them a majority of the Board. 9 The Board's first order
of business at its first meeting was firing the Atlanta law firm and replacing
them with San Mateo County Counsel, and the second was placing
the superintendent on administrative leave and appointing an interim
superintendent to serve until the current superintendent's contract expired
90 See, e.g., T.S. Mills-Faraudo, Ravenswood School District Candidates Want Knight Ousted,
SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, July 31, zoo2, at I A, TS. Mils-Faraudo, Judge Slams Knight For Hiring
Official Despite Order, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Sept. 5, 2002, at IA Sara Neufeld, Lawyers for
Students Accuse East PA. Superintendent, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 26, 2002, at 3B; Sara
Neufeld, Roles, Responsibilities of Schools Czar at Issue: Challenger Emerges for Superintendent in
San Mateo County, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Feb. 28, 2002, at 7B; Sara Neufeld, County: East
PA. District Negligent: Investigation Calls Ravenswood Leaders' Work 'Unacceptable', SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEWS, Mar. 5, 2002, at IA; Sara Neufeld, Teachers Show TheirMight: Ravenswood Staff
Members, Who Were Previously Silentfor Fear of Being Fired, Join in the Callfor a Change in District
Leadership, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, May 2, 2002, at IB; Sara Neufeld, East PA. Community
Protests with 'Funeral' for Ravenswood: A Call/or Change, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, May 30,
2002, at iB; Sara Neufeld, Put on Leave: Schools Chief Now FacingNew Probe, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEWS, Dec. 10,2002, at I A; Sara Neufeld, First Day Goes Smoothly in Wake of District Strife, SAN
JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Dec. 11,2002, at IB; Sara Neufeld, District at Risk of County Takeover, SAN
JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Dec. 24, 2002, at IB; Joe Rodriguez, Schools Chief Made the Grade on East
Side, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Dec. 14, 2002, at IB ("A crook ran the Ravenswood district in
East Palo Alto.").
91 Sara Neufeld, Teachers Ask to be Part of Suit: Problems at Schools Described in Filing, SAN
JOSE MERCURY NEWS, May 18, 2002, at B.
92 See, e.g., Ryan Kim, New School Board in East Palo Alto; Woods, Woodward Lead Council
Race, SAN F.ANcsco CHRONICLE, Nov. 6, 2002, at Az8.
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at the end of the school year.93 It was this surprise election and the Board's
activities that paved the way for the finalization of a truly collaboratively for
designed special education reform plan, what would henceforth be known
as the Ravenswood Self-Improvement Plan ("RSIP"). 94
The RSIP is an intentional hybrid between a traditional command-
and-control remedial order and an outcomes-oriented, data-driven,
experimentalist school reform plan. It is structured into 14 broad "Items." 95
Each "Item" targets a specific area in which the District's special education
service delivery system needed reformation.96 The "Items" range from
those matters specifically delineated in the IDEA and its implementing
regulations (e.g., assessments and development of IEPs) to reforms
targeting the service delivery infrastructure (e.g., a policies and procedures
manual and student tracking database) to reforms aimed at building parent
and staff capacity for implementation (e.g., parent training, staff training,
and staff recruitment and retention) to outcomes-oriented goals and
targets (e.g., IEP implementation and integrated educational practices). 97
Each item contains a broadly worded "Expected Results" statement that
serves to guide the work of the Item, followed by identification of "Persons
Responsible" for implementation, and specific "Corrective Activities" that
are broken-down into detailed and measurable "Requirements" that are
met through specified "Evidence of Performance."9
Wary of the District's past recalcitrance and recognizing the that the
IDEA and its implementing regulations provide very clear and detailed
substantive and procedural rules for certain activities, Plaintiffs insisted
that certain Items track the strict requirements of the IDEA.99 For instance,
93 See, e.g., Sara Neufeld, Swift Action on Chief Vowed: Incoming Ravenswood Board to Seek
Knight Ouster End Suit, SAN JOSE MERcURY NEws, Nov. 7, 2002, at I B.
94 Emma C. v. Eastin, No. C-9 6-4 17 9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. i2, 2003) (Ravenswood Self
Improvement Plan), available at http://www.law.stanford.edu/program/clinics/youtheducation/
pdf/emmac-rsip.pdf [hereinafter Ravenswood Self Improvement Plan].
95 Id.
96 The "Items" are: (; Description of Service Delivery, Policies and Procedures Manual,
Student Tracking Database, Program Evaluation; (2) Parent Training; (3) Staff Training; (4)
Early Childhood Find; (5) Student Success Teams; (6) Assessments; (7) Functional Analysis
Assessments and Behavioral Intervention Plans; (8) Parent Participation in Child's IEPs and
Education; (9) Development of IEPs; (io) Integrated Educational Practices; (i i) Access
to Extracurricular Activities; (12) Implementation of IEPs and Student Progress; 03) Staff
Recruitment and Retention; and (14) Complaint Investigation and Resolution. Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 One might wonder why an experimentalist approach would be necessary or whether
experimentalism is even possible in those instances in which the statutory and regulatory
regime provides detailed rules for compliance. After all, if the legal requirements are clear,
why should there be any need for an evolving "rolling rule" regime? Why isn't the appropri-
ate judicial role that of dictating compliance with the law? Even in those situations in which
the legal requirements appear detailed and clear, however, the methods to achieve compli-
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the IDEA provides clear requirements for the contents of a child's IEP
Accordingly, Item 9 tracks the IDEA's requirements of, for example, timing
of the IEP, required IEP participants, required components of the JEP,
etc. 100 Each Requirement in Item 9 tracks the language of the IDEA and
calls for specific evidence of compliance that is gleaned from the Monitor's
review of children's IEPs.10 1 While this approach to remediation does not
dictate the specifics of how the District will ensure compliance, it does
produce the oft-derided "compliance mentality" among District staff.
The parties also recognized, however, that the District lacked both
the infrastructure and capacity to ensure the provision of a FAPE in the
LRE. Consequently, several Items required the development of basic
infrastructure. For instance, Item 1 required the development of compliant
policies and procedures and a student tracking database.102 Remarkably,
the District had neither an up-to-date procedures manual for staff, nor did
it have an electronic database capable of tracking students, the relevant
timelines for each student's educational planning, or the services each
student was to receive. Naturally, the Evidence of Performance here was
the end-product-a manual and a database.
Moreover, even with certain infrastructure in place, the parties also
knew that Ravenswood's faculty and staff would require training in not
only the implementation of the RSIP, but also the various "best practices"
activities required by the RSIP such as the development of positive
behavioral interventions for students whose behavior impeded their
learning. Even with such capacity, however, there was the perennial
concern that experienced teachers would leave the District for "easier"
suburban assignments. As a result, the RSIP contains not only training
components, but also specific goals for recruitment and retention of fully
qualified personnel. 3
Finally, certain RSIP Items are consciously experimentalist in nature.
Most obvious is Item 10's "Integrated Educational Practices," the goal of
which is to ensure that all Ravenswood children are educated with their non-
disabled peers to the "maximum extent appropriate. '" '° While the over-
ance-which might include the establishment of complex policies, the provision of training,
and the implementation of administrative practices-may be amenable to negotiation and
stakeholder input. Moreover, where the parties agree that technical compliance itself is only
the means to a more important end-e.g., the development of compliant IEPs is only a means
to ensure that children with disabilities receive a FAPE-the parties may choose to achieve
the provision of FAPE through more than just developing compliant IEPs; the parties in de-
liberations may go further to consider such matters as administrative oversight, staffing, and
the revision of service delivery policies.
ioo Ravenswood Self Improvement Plan, supra note 94, at 43-48.
ioi Id.
io2 Id. at 2-7.
103 Id. at 59-61.
104 Id. at 49-52.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
arching goal of integration of children, or, stated differently, the removal
of children with disabilities from general education under very limited
circumstances, is easily stated, the parties realized that the development
of a plan to achieve that goal would be difficult. General education
teachers and site administrators would need to substantially change their
practices to permit the integration of children with moderate to severe
disabilities such as mental retardation, severe emotional disturbance, or
severe mobility impairments. Schoolwide plans would need to be made,
including the institution of positive behavioral intervention teams. And
indicators of success would need to be developed. Consequently, Item 10
is in the form of a plan to plan. The parties agreed on certain parameters
for an integration plan, including the "design [of] the critical features [and
an] implementation and assessment system for the comprehensive least
restrictive environment plan" and that such "critical features" ensure that
"no student with an IEP ... will spend more than 30% of his or her school
week outside the regular class."'0 5 The parties even agreed on a consultant
to develop the plan, but they left the development and implementation up
to the consultant and District office and site personnel. Dr. Wayne Sailor, a
nationally recognized scholar in "integrated" educational practices, was the
consensus choice for consultant and he was given free rein to work with
District personnel to develop a plan to integrate the District's children.
Since the 2003 court approval of the RSIP, on a quarterly basis, the Court
Monitor and his consultants have reviewed the Evidence of Performance
for each of the many requirements and corrective activities in the RSIP.
He makes specific findings of compliance or non-compliance for each
requirement and documents his findings in a detailed report to the Court,
the parties, and any member of the public who would wish to review the
District's remedial activities. Such continuous monitoring and feedback
has proven essential.
What became immediately apparent was that the District was quite
capable of quickly fulfilling the requirements to establish policies, develop
a database, and put in place a system for identifying young children with
disabilities. Each of these tasks was quite discrete and relatively simple
to accomplish through assignment to dedicated staff. The same was true
for implementation of the teacher training components, which required
only that teachers be trained, not that the training result in any specific
performance outcomes.
Even more promising has been the District's success in working with Dr.
Sailor to develop a cutting-edge integrated educational practices plan and
implementing that plan. The plan, known as the Schoolwide Applications
Model ("SAM") focuses on the individual school as the unit of analysis
and requires that each neighborhood school develop systems and capacity
105 Id.
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to educate all children, irrespective of the severity of disability, in the
neighborhood school. °6 The SAM model is driven by key performance
indicators, i.e., specific and measurable critical features for each school
site, such as (1) whether the school serves all students, (2) whether general
education teachers assume responsibility for all students at the school, (3)
whether the school has an active, schoolwide positive behavioral support
program operating at all levels, and (4) whether the school is a data-driven,
collective, decision-making learning organization with all major functions
guided by team processes. 07 Each quarter, Dr. Sailor and his consultants
visit the school site, collect data for each performance indicator, and rate the
school as being in the "initiation," "implementation," or "sustainability"
phase.08 When a school achieves sustainability for two consecutive
quarterly reporting phases, it is deemed to have "enculturated" the SAM
process and be in compliance with Item 10. Equally important, Dr. Sailor
works with school staff and administration to develop policies and practices
around staffing, supports, and interventions that will permit achievement of
sustainability. Each quarter, Dr. Sailor provides detailed recommendations
to the school site and District as to how they can improve practice to meet
the desired outcomes of Item 10. This has been an on-going process of
data-driven learning among administration, teachers, and consultants.
While there is much work to be done, many schools have moved quickly to
full inclusion of all children with disabilities and many of the interventions
designed for children with disabilities have also been used with under-
performing children without disabilities. In SAM terms, as of June 2009,
three schools have achieved "enculturation" with another three that
achieved "sustainability" and are approaching "enculturation."'°9 Indeed, so
successful is the SAM model in Ravenswood that the national organization
committed to inclusive education, TASH, recently recognized Ravenswood
and SAM as being exemplary among urban school districts."0
Now the not-so-good news. Less successful has been the District's
efforts to comply with the specific "command-and-control" oriented items
that track the details of the IDEA. While the provision of FAPE under the
io6 See SAM Schools-Welcome to SAM Schools, http://samschools.orglindex.php/
home.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2oo).
107 See SAM Schools--Critical Features of SAM, http://samschools.org/index.php/criti-
calfeatures.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2oo).
io8 WAYNE SAILOR, "INCLUSION EXPERT" REPORT #25, at 2-3 (2009) (on file with author).
Io9 Id. at Appendix G.
I IO See, e.g., Press Release, Ravenswood City Sch. Dist., Ravenswood City School
District Honored for Inclusive Educ. Practices: Dist. Commended as Nat'l Model of
Transformation, (Nov. 27, 2oo7), http://www.ravenswood.kl2.ca.us/news-and-events/press-
releases/ravenswood-city-school-district-honored-for-inclusive-education-practices; Cal-
TASH Awards, http://www.tash.orgtchapters/caltashlawards.htm (last modified Nov. 16, 2005);
see also Banks Albach, Advocacy Group Lauds Ravenswood Schools, SAN MATEO COUNTY TIMES,
Dec. I, 2007 at News.
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IDEA might be the ultimate goal, the District's focus on compliance with
the procedural aspects of the IDEA (embodied in the RSIP) has fostered
the development of checklists, detailed databases, and other (arguably
unnecessary and time-consuming) paperwork to demonstrate compliance.
And, even with the obsessive attention paid to box-checking and protocols,
the District has been unable to achieve compliance with the major process-
oriented items of the RSIP (e.g., assessments and IEPs).
More troubling is the District's recent backsliding on Item 12 which
monitors whether District personnel are actually providing the services
and implementing the accommodations and interventions specified in
children's IEPs. It is worth noting that, in report after report, the Monitor
has detailed the specific areas of non-compliance, yet the District has been
unable to meet the requirements of the RSIP and law. During the 2007-
08 school year, these problems reached a crescendo as the District coped
with a staffing crisis that left open many school psychologist, speech and
language therapist, and special education teacher positions. As a result,
even more children went unserved during that period.
Judge Henderson has not been unaware of the District's failings, nor
has the District's co-defendant, the CDE. On at least a semi-annual basis,
Judge Henderson has been holding status conferences and requiring the
parties to put before him issues of concern. On several occasions, portions
of the RSIP have proven either unworkable or even inappropriate given
evolving legal standards. As he has done through the entire Consent Decree
and RSIP negotiation process, Judge Henderson has taken a decidedly
hands-off, experimentalist approach to such issues, demanding that the
parties meet-and-confer to reach resolution. If such negotiations fail, the
Court Monitor would be required to make a recommendation and, only
if disagreement persists, would the court intervene in the development
of appropriate modifications. The court has employed the same process
for those matters, usually identified by Plaintiffs, that ought to be added
to the RSIP, thus creating additional legal requirements. Notably, despite
many disagreements over these matters, only on rare occasions has Judge
Henderson been called upon to rule.
More commonly, Plaintiffs and the Monitor have identified significant
items of non-compliance, including assessments, IEPs, and IEP
implementation. The court's response to those issues has similarly been
that of expressing his broad goals and directing the parties to develop
remedial plans through bargaining. No doubt the leverage Plaintiffs
possess during this bargaining is greater than that which they would enjoy
were the issue not before the court. Yet, the fact that the court requires
the parties to reach a consensual resolution creates a collaborative (albeit
occasionally tense) atmosphere in which compromise toward a common
goal is necessary.
In the wake of the District's staffing crisis, the court directed the CDE
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to take a more active role in assisting the District to implement the RSIP.
While the Court ordered specific steps, such as the immediate placement
of CDE staff on the ground to assist with IEP development, the Court also
directed the CDE and parties to develop longer term plans to avoid future
staffing difficulties and to address the major areas of non-compliance.
Although that bargaining process did not achieve a resolution among all
three parties, the proposal put forth by Plaintiffs, supported by the District,
and opposed in only certain aspects by the CDE, resulted in a decidedly
experimentalist court order. After each of the Monitor's reports, the parties
now meet to discuss the specific, significant areas of non-compliance and
develop specific remedial plans to address those areas. Consistent with the
Court's directive, the CDE must play-and has played-an active role in
developing the remedial plans and in committing resources to the remedial
plans. While this process has only recently been employed, it has already
resulted in modest improvement in IEP implementation, as the CDE and
the District have developed a stronger accountability regime that tracks
each service provider's work and seeks to ensure that services are being
delivered.
IV. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Would the evolution toward experimentalist school reform and
governance have proceeded without the Rose litigation? Probably. Would
certain courts be moving away from command-and-control structural
reform litigation to a non-court-centric model of judicial review and
experimentalist remedial reform? Probably. For those judges who view
their role as providing a check on the abuses of majoritarian politics, sitting
on the sidelines would not be an option. Nor, however, would dictating
remedies from the bench-the defining characteristic of early desegregation
orders-be an option. A logical alternative-which has been evolving
in a range of cases from school reform to prison reform to child welfare
reform-would be that of destabilizing the status quo, disentrenchment of
certain elites, and the flowering of a new political bargaining under court
supervision. In other words, experimentalism.
Yet Rose is a critical link in this evolution. Rose went beyond the typical
school finance case dictate that the legislature should develop a more
equitable funding scheme. Rose inserted the court into the governance of
and policy-making for Kentucky's schools and gave voice to those who would
improve the educational system, particularly for the most disadvantaged.
Rose demonstrates that the judiciary can play a role in destabilizing the
status quo and broadening the range of politically viable options. The
court's "liability determination empowers the plaintiffs vis-A-vis the
2009-201o1
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defendants." '' This newly-found power is both symbolic and functional.
"It provides official legitimation of their claims. The plaintiffs now have
the power, simply by objecting to the defendant's proposed remedy, to
expose the defendant to further risk and uncertainty. Consequently, the
defendant has stronger reason to deal with the plaintiffs.""' While Rose is
recognized as an instance in which political elites on both sides were able
to "take cover" behind a court order to do the politically unpopular, the
fundamental idea is much the same: destabilize the status quo, compel the
parties to deliberate over a remedial regime, and empower stakeholders
whose voice was previously silenced. Two decades later, we are still
experimenting with the experimentalist model in Emma C.
First let me be clear: the Emma C. case has gone on too long. No
advocate for children would want to see such lengthy litigation followed by
an even lengthier remedial phase. But that is the nature of school reform.
It is, as Milbrey McLaughlin and Richard Elmore called it, "steady work." 3
Litigation for school reform is, then, necessarily "steady work," requiring
the steady persistence of a Judge Henderson. Indeed, Judge Henderson
has hardly played the stereotypical role of command-and-control judge.
At several crucial moments during the litigation, Judge Henderson has
threatened draconian remedies for District non-compliance, e.g., state
takeover, but first demanded that the parties try to work it out with a heavy
thumb on the Plaintiffs' side of the scale. Such threats have assisted in
the disentrenchment of the uncooperative leadership of the District and
significantly altered the expectations of all stakeholders.
Indeed, throughout the remedial process, while reserving his contempt
powers for egregious situations of non-compliance and recalcitrance,
Judge Henderson has instead expressed his broad goals for the parties to
pursue and deferred first to the parties, and then his Monitor, to revise the
remedial scheme. Necessarily, that process has engaged not only the top
administrators and lawyers from the parties, it has often called upon rank-
and-file personnel such as technology personnel and teachers to play a role.
Through on-going monitoring, learning, and revision of remedial plans, the
District and CDE are moving toward compliance. As Simon, Sabel, and
Liebman would say, this "rolling rule regime" has permitted organizational
learning and incremental movement toward systems improvement. Yet,
despite the forward progress and successes, several challenges with the
experimentalist design are becoming apparent. Here are three emerging
concerns with partial responses to those concerns.
First, the experimentalist approach requires time and expertise. And,
as I discussed above, for most plaintiffs and their constituencies, school
I11 Sabel & Simon, supra note 16, at 1077.
iiz Id.
113 RICHARD F. ELMORE & MILBREY WALLIN McLOUGHLIN, STEADY WORK: POLICY,
PRACTICE, AND THE REFORM OF AMERICAN EDUCATION 4 (1988).
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reform (or, institutional reform generally) is not their day job."14 My
clients in the Emma C. case no longer actively participate in the (often
tedious) deliberative remedial process that is the hallmark of the on-going
experimentalist regime in the case. Indeed, "Emma C." herself graduated
from high school years ago and none of the original named plaintiffs or
larger group of families that worked tirelessly with me during the crafting
of the First Amended Consent Decree and RSIP are in the District any
more. The result has been a much greater reliance on those who are paid to
be a part of the process, such as the Monitor and his consultants, the CDE
and District lawyers and administrators, my colleagues from the Disability
Rights Education and Defense Fund and me, and those who have the
time and have developed the legal and educational expertise to participate
meaningfully in deliberations. This, of course, raises ethical concerns about
client decision-making and representation for the plaintiffs' lawyers who
are obliged to represent the interests of the plaintiff class."5  In addition,
from the perspective of the experimentalist this appears not to be the type
of robust, bottom-up "new public" envisioned.
While I remain comfortable that Iam representing my client constituency
well in this process and continue to represent many individual children and
families in the District, I do not have the space here to address the ethical
concerns. For purposes of this Article, I am more concerned with whether
a central assumption of the experimentalist ideal is undermined by the lack
of active, day-to-day participation of the original plaintiffs or those similarly
situated. Asked differently, is the "new public" properly composed of all
relevant stakeholders? On this question, I would offer a tentative and
highly-qualified "yes." Though it is far from ideal, poverty lawyers, and
those who would engage in school reform work generally and school reform
litigation specifically, must come to grips with the reality that the demands
of time and expertise are simply too great for most of our clients and client
constituency over the lengthy time horizon necessary for this type of
work. While we can (and should) attempt to continuously maintain and
reconstitute our client group (and I certainly have done so in the event
of any decision-making outside of the routine mechanics of monitoring,
problem-spotting, and developing new "rolling rules"), we must leave the
day-to-day monitoring, bargaining, and implementation of experimentalist
decrees to appropriate surrogates for the plaintiff constituency whose day
job is the ongoing work of school reform. That is, the plaintiffs' lawyers-
114 See supra text accompanying notes 64-73.
I I5 See generally Derrick Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests
in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 512, 516 (1976); Lynn Mather, What Do
Clients Want? What Do Lawyers Do?, 52 EMORY L.J. io65 (2003); Ann Southworth, Colkctive
Representation for the Disadvantaged: Variations in Probkms of Accountability, 67 FoiiHAM L. REv.
2249 (1999); Ann Southworth, Lawyer-Client Decisionmaking in Civil Rights and Poverty Practice:
An EmpiricalStudy of Lawyers' Norms, 9 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1101, 1115-17, 1139-40 (1996).
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who are duty-bound to represent their clients-and their consultants. The
alternative is that this work will not be done, or at least only rarely so.
It is likely that I am reminding us of an uncomfortable truth about our
work in an experimentalist regime. My view, however, is that it is better
to identify, explain, and defend the necessity of this surrogate work, and,
more important, to begin a conversation about how to ensure that we are
appropriately and best representing the community. No doubt being
involved in representing children and families on an ongoing basis has
proved invaluable for us as plaintiffs' counsel. No doubt attendance at
community and parent group meetings has been invaluable. No doubt
episodic consultation with plaintiffclass members is necessary. The question
of what more can and should be done remains open for discussion.
Second, although endemic to all long-term school reform work, Emma
C. exemplifies the difficulty of maintaining a culture of data-driven
experimentalism and the organizational capacity to implement systems
reform where there remains great difficulty in recruiting and retaining the
street-level professionals and administrators to engage in such difficult work.
This was not unanticipated. Item 3 of the RSIP specifically provides for
staff training, while Item 13 outlines a plan and goals for staff recruitment
and retention."6 Despite those provisions, the District continues to suffer
from relatively large teacher and administrative turnover. The most
obvious manifestation of that attrition was the staffing crisis of the 2007-
08 school year and the resulting denial of services to children. But, from
a long-term, deliberative process of school reform, the consequences of
turnover are insidious: (1) the need to train junior teachers in not only their
classroom craft, but also the specifics of the RSIP and SAM model; (2) the
perpetual loss of institutional knowledge and culture around the systems
reform work of the RSIP; and (3) the natural lack of buy-in among new
teachers and administrators who had no hand in crafting the remedial plan.
For this reason, interalia, Ravenswood has been quite successful in putting
in place the structural reforms necessary for RSIP implementation, such as
a student tracking database, but has been much less effective in ensuring
implementation of the RSIP and improving student outcomes.
To be sure, any long-term school reform project in a school district
that has relatively undesirable working conditions suffers from these
symptoms of teacher turnover. But the problem is exacerbated where
there is a deliberative process model of school reform that requires long-
term engagement among persons with dedication to and knowledge of the
underlying ills and the attempted solutions. Perhaps this is the district's
parallel difficulty to the plaintiffs' difficulty of maintaining a stable and
engaged client constituency, but the difference is that the plaintiff children
ultimately suffer the consequences for the district's inability to maintain
116 Ravenswood Self Improvement Plan, supra note 94, at I I- 17, 59-61.
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consistent personnel.
One way to address the turnover-and-loss-of-capacity issue is to build-
in rigid processes that focus on the district tasks necessary for compliance,
while requiring very little understanding of the overall project. This, of
course, is anathema to the ideals of bottom-up school reform that changes
the very core of teaching and learning in the service of children with
disabilities. Yet, this is precisely what the parties have come to do over
time-develop more paperwork, checklists, and bureaucratic oversight,
essentially "teacher-proofing" the reform process. There are better
solutions, including financial and other incentives, to undertake the hard
work of reform and engage in that reform over time, but those incentives
generally cost money that is not available in many ailing school districts.
That said, I am increasingly of the mind that such performance incentives,
particularly for the administrative leadership, need to be built into the fiber
of consent decrees.
Third, in rare instances, some violations of legal rights simply require
command-and-control remedies with the backing of significant threats of
sanction. Recall the original corrective action plan in Emma C., the RCAP.
Though the plan was a model for collaborative school reform, it was useless
in the hands of a recalcitrant administration. With Judge Henderson's
finding of contempt, the parties were compelled to negotiate a plan that was
much more detailed in its requirements, so that there would be no question
as to the tasks necessary for compliance and the evidence required to prove
such compliance. Fortunately, with a new cast of characters leading the
District, all parties felt comfortable with the inclusion of experimentalist
reform in some components of the re-negotiated corrective action plan.
These are likely not the only challenges for the experimentalist approach
to school reform litigation. One can imagine different problems arising
where the target of the reform is legislative policy and the "new public"
is composed of state legislators and the executive branch instead of local
school district administrators and teachers. But any such shortcomings, in
my view, should not condemn what has been a productive way for courts
to engage stakeholders in equity-minded school reform. As I mentioned
before, however, time will tell whether individual judges and the judiciary
as a whole have the capacity and staying power to engage in such long-term
reform projects.

